

**United States Foreign Assistance
Oral History Program**

Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection

An Interview with

David Jickling

1998

**Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Arlington, Virginia**

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ASSOCIATION FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES AND TRAINING ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, was established in 1986 to enhance the training of foreign affairs personnel and to instill in the public a greater appreciation for our diplomatic history.

The Association's Foreign Affairs Oral History Program was established in 1988 and is housed in the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University and at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA. The collection is comprised of oral histories taken from a number of projects, with the unifying factor that all concern the conduct of American foreign affairs and experiences of those employed in the field of diplomacy and consular affairs and their families.

The oral history collection includes interviews done under the auspices of the Foreign Service History Center of George Washington University, which was amalgamated into the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, the Foreign Service Family Project, the Women Ambassadors' Project, the United States Information Agency Alumni Association Project, the Foreign Assistance (AID) Oral History Project, the Senior Officers' Project, the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project and others.

The aim of the US Foreign Assistance Oral History Program, in particular, is to develop a collection of oral histories of those who have served USAID and predecessor agencies and those who have served in foreign assistance programs of associated organizations such as private firms, private voluntary organizations, and other US government agencies. The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) of the USAID has made a grant to help finance the preparation of 120 oral histories.

For the most part these interviews are carried out by retired USAID personnel on a volunteer basis, directed by the Oral History Program. The interviews are unclassified, and unless so marked are available for use by researchers. Most of these interviews have been transcribed and then returned to the person interviewed for editing. The transcript is an edited version, and is not a word for word rendition of the cassette tape. The editing usually consists of correcting of names and dates that have been missed during an interview. The individual interviewed may also choose to expand upon topics that may not have been developed in the time allotted for the interview.

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KEY WORDS

DAVID JICKLING

access roads
agriculture
Alliance for Progress
bi-lingual education
Bolivia
Brazil
Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM)
Central Computer Center (CENACO)
Chile
civil service
cocaine
Colombia
communications seminar
communists
community development
corruption
Cuba
customs house
democratically elected governments
Development Administration
Development Studies Program (DSP)
Ecuador
education of women
education
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
European Recovery Program
family planning
Fundo de Inversion Social
Ghana
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
immigration
Indian population
infrastructure
Institute of Public Administration
Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA)
Inter-American highway
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
international training program

International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
Iran
jumping up and down theory
local government decentralization
local leaders
Local Service for Urban Development (CENDUSENACO)
malaria control
management education
Managua reconstruction
mapping
merit systems
migration
municipal association
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama Canal
Paraguay
Peace Corps
personnel systems
population pressures
potable water
preventive medicine
public health nursing
public sector management
public safety program
rural education
Sandinistas
servicios
small farmers
small enterprise
Somoza
Tanzania
tax administration
tax offices
tax administration
tourism
training spouses

**United States Foreign Affairs Oral History Program
Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training**

An interview with
David Jickling

Interviewed by: W. Haven North
Initial interview date: September 14, 1998

Q: Today is September 14, 1998, and this is an interview with David L. Jickling. David, give us a thumbnail sketch of your career, not the details, so we can get a flavor of your involvement with the Foreign Assistance program.

Overview of career in foreign assistance

JICKLING: I began while I was in college at the University of Chicago with a summer internship in 1951 with ECA, the Marshall Plan. I was in the office of personnel. I had a series of typical intern kinds of projects. One of them which still plagues foreign aid and foreign assistance programs was how to get women, the wives, involved in training.

Q: We'll come back to that.

JICKLING: I went on to finish my work at Chicago and then went on to Washington as a management analyst with the Navy Department. But I was always interested in Foreign Affairs and international assistance. Because of that summer internship I knew the recruiters, and so in the three years I was with the Navy, I was constantly talking about opportunities overseas with ECA or at that time, ICA. In 1958, 40 years ago, I joined ICA with a training program in public administration which ran workshops for foreign participants about administrative management. I was there three years and then assigned to Guatemala for three tours, 1961-1968 as a public administration advisor working on administrative reform in the Ministry of Finance and government wide. At the end it appeared I gravitated toward local government because that became a mission priority. Then I came back to Washington to work in the Technical Assistance Bureau which was the central bureau at that time of AID, and worked with Joel Bernstein and Jack Koteen on the same area but at that time it was called Development Administration. I was there for three years and then was assigned as public administration officer and education officer in Bolivia and was there for five years in the early 70's. I came back to Washington for two years with the Development Studies Program, which was a great education because I went through five cycles of that course with the staff trying to figure out what development was about, how you achieve change. The focus at that time was on small farmers and agricultural productivity. My final assignment with AID was in the last days of Somoza, a sad time in Nicaragua, as Program Officer, and I left in 1978. I went back to Michigan where I had grown up, and taught for five years including taking students abroad, and then began a consulting career which has lasted for the last twenty years which included a variety of assignments in thirty some countries

around the world. I still do essentially the same thing that I did when I went overseas with AID in 1961.

Early years and education

Q: Well, let's go back to your early years and your education. Where did you grow up? Where did you go to school? Was there anything during that time that got you interested in international affairs?

JICKLING: I grew up in rural Michigan between Battle Creek and Kalamazoo, about halfway between Detroit and Chicago in a rural setting and went to a rural school. Fifth grade was really the opening for me to the world. A fifth grade geography teacher with whom I am still in contact, taught geography and world affairs in a way that captured my interest. From that time on I never had any doubt that I wanted to travel. I wanted to look at and try to understand people in different parts of the world.

Q: What triggered that?

JICKLING: This one lady, I attribute it to, taught geography in such a way as to just involve us.

Q: I understand.

JICKLING: I think that was a signal point. Then, I served in the military and was in the Philippines. That was really my first overseas experience just after World War II at the time of independence. I was involved in Philippine US relationships, particularly the law enforcement problems in that immediate post war period in the Philippines. It gave me a flavor of overseas living, and I never got over it.

Q: What were you serving in; what was the unit?

JICKLING: I was serving in criminal investigation. We were investigating problems of wrongdoing of American GI's and deserters. There were 300 deserters we were trying to track down, but also questions of relationships between GI's and Filipinos. We were sitting on top of a huge warehouse full of materials for the invasion of Japan. The Filipinos wanted to have access to them. It was a real problem, a massive problem of friction and conflict. The GIs just wanted to go home, and they were there because there was a lack of transport or there was a policy that we should just be there to do something with all that material and with the whole infrastructure we had built to support the invasion of Japan. I had a civilian type role and didn't have a uniform or rank and worked with a Filipino. Together the pair of us were constantly going around the islands trying to solve local problems. Then I came back and went on to graduate school and began an internship assignment in Washington.

Q: What did you study in graduate school?

JICKLING: It was public administration by a man who was a close confidante of Donald Stone. He

was Leonard White, a founder of the study of public administration at least in the middle west. He inspired me to do comparative studies. I did my masters degree on a comparison between the British and American civil service in terms of standards of conduct and codes of ethics. That took me to summer school in Oxford and quite extensive research into the British administrative service. That also stimulated my interest and gave me a chance to see Europe.

Q: What was the concept of administration they were teaching at that time? What was the emphasis?

JICKLING: The emphasis was on economy and efficiency, to get the job done with less resources and to do it better. It was an administrative systems approach to the better use of resources.

Q: So after graduate school where did you go?

JICKLING: I taught for a few years because I wanted to follow the academic road, but after two or three years I decided I really couldn't teach about government and public administration unless I did it, so I came to Washington as a junior officer in the Navy Department.

Q: What year was this?

JICKLING: That was in 1955. I worked for three years in management improvement in the Navy which was a very progressive organization in applying computers and modern methods of administration to the management problems of the Navy. It was a very stimulating experience. I had constant contact with my old friends in the foreign aid agency.

Q: Then after your work with the Navy...

JICKLING: I joined AID which at that time was ICA.

Q: But you said you had a time with the Marshall Plan.

JICKLING: Yes. In the summer of 1951, I worked for three months with the Marshall Plan here in Washington in the personnel office helping with problems of training people going to Europe to administer the European Recovery Program.

Q: This was an orientation type program or what?

JICKLING: I worked as an intern on a series of assignments, for example, the proper training of wives and accompanying dependents, preparing them for the overseas assignments. How we could use federal funds for training people who weren't technically federal employees but were dependents. That was a real dilemma. We worked it out. Everyone agreed that you had to train not only the principal person but also the dependents to prepare them for overseas work.

Q: What were you training the spouses in?

JICKLING: We trained them in language, number one; also on being a good supporting person for the role of what the principal person was doing, what was the US interest in this kind of program and why we were going.

Q: What kind of role were you defining for the spouses?

JICKLING: For the spouses to be supportive and understanding and sympathetic to local interests and not just as the military tended to do set themselves apart as a separate isolated community, to be more empathetic with local culture and values.

Q: You came to work with ICA in what year?

Joined ICA with the International Training Program - 1958

JICKLING: I joined ICA in 1958. I had a wonderful experience training people from some different countries all over the world.

Q: What was your position?

JICKLING: I was a training officer at 1624 H, which is a block from the White House. We still go back and have lunch from time to time in the space where our office was.

Q: Was it in the personnel office?

JICKLING: This was the training office, the training branch of the Public Administration division of ICA. Public administration then was centralized. It wasn't broken up by regions. ICA was an agency with central technical offices. The Public Administration Division had within it different geographic desks, but it also had a central training branch. We had in any one year perhaps 1,000 trainees from all around the world. There were about a dozen of us all interested in training and the transfer of skills in what we called administrative management. How to do things better. We covered personnel and supply, budget, accounting, and a tax program. We covered these basic elements or techniques of administration.

Q: Was it a very large program at that time?

JICKLING: We had about a dozen people working in the program and perhaps 1000 people a year coming through the program. It was a tremendous experience because in our discussions and roundtables and workshops we organized, we had a chance to talk about the problems of managing public sector activities in a whole variety of countries.

Q: How did the trainees do in this program? Did you get a sense of how they made use of this training experience?

JICKLING: Well, in 1960, for example, I was interested in Nigeria. We had a major program with

about 40 Nigerian men who had been appointed to key positions in the government of the newly independent Nigeria. They were extremely able men and they came full of curiosity about systems. Not that what they saw in the U.S. was immediately applicable to their country. We were constantly concerned with the fact that US systems weren't directly applicable; they had to be adapted, not just adopted. I remember those Nigerians so well because of their pride, their background, their enthusiasm, their interest in everything. Whether or not they made a difference when they got back, who knows. Their country has had such awful difficulties since then. I often ask about them. I have a list of their names, and I ask Nigerians whom I run into today if any of these people have gone on to become well known or to make an impact. Their names are not known today.

Q: Was there an evaluation of this training?

JICKLING: Not to my knowledge. There was never a follow-up to try to pinpoint what the training did to people after they got back home. During this period there was a lot of interest in this. Michigan State University had a communications seminar which to me was a great innovation, a great feather in the cap of foreign aid. We spent a lot of money for 10 or 15 years at least so that each participant went through an intensive one week program before they went home. The whole emphasis was on how to apply what you have learned in the United States to the home situation. It was called a communications seminar because the theme of it was to communicate you had to be a listener, you had to have a message that was relevant to the listener, and you had to present it in a way that was acceptable that would help that person move from where they are in the direction you wanted. This was the essence of communication. It was very well done.

Q: I understand. Was there a large public administration program generally not just training at that time. What kind of projects were we involved in?

JICKLING: This was a top priority. In a country in the Near East like Iran, we had 20 to 30 public administration advisors at that time working in these same fields we were doing training in. We had personnel advisors not only in Tehran in the central government, but in some of the provincial governments. We had advisors in tax administration that worked extensively in modernizing whatever the tax system was. We had advisors in census and statistics, budget and accounting, supply and materials management. Some of our very best people worked in Iran; it was a major mission. They were all enthusiastic about the innovations which the Shah of Iran was furthering at the time. I remember vividly sitting in on the debriefing sessions we had which were recorded and how they talked about strategies and techniques and what was acceptable and what wasn't and who were the people that really counted in terms of introducing change and getting things done and how they tried to work with those people, and who were the traditionalists, the ones who didn't want change. It was a liberal arts education for me in the art of technical assistance. That was just one country. We had almost every week someone coming back from some country talking about their program generally but also specifically what they were trying to do. The purpose was to record and diffuse this experience, to share ideas and make all of us a little more aware of the complexities of what we were trying to do.

Q: What sense do you have of the impact of this work in Iran or any of the other countries?

JICKLING: Iran is a good example. For example in Iran we had a major contractor with the best public administration school in the United States, Henry Reining and the University of Southern California. They had a large team working in Iran at the same time. It was a big effort. The outcome, not the immediate results which were how many people were trained or what happened to budget or census or some other specific activity or tax collection. The outcome, the long term impact, is something that is so difficult to evaluate and almost always is really unintended and is a big surprise. Later in the 1970's I had a chance with Herb Turner (Chief of AID evaluation) to go around the world looking at projects to see the outcomes. This is 10-15 years later after the project activity, and this is really the question I think you are asking. So often they were completely unintended and sometimes beneficial and sometimes perhaps even counterproductive. For example, I remember going to Pakistan looking at a health project which was a public health program in the 1950's and early 1960's. This is 10-15 years after the project had taken place. The focus was on public health nursing to get better care particularly pre-natal and child care into rural communities where there were no doctors. Massachusetts General Hospital had been the contractor, and it had been a major effort in Pakistan. We went back in the 1970's to look and found that those nurses had almost entirely left the country. Many of them were working in Libya. They were sending money home, but they weren't really contributing to Pakistan's development. But even worse, those who stayed in Pakistan were almost all in curative work. That is where the money was; that is where the demand was, and the preventive emphasis, going into the villages and working with women, was simply lost. So often when you go right straight through the projects, that is what happened. The outcome was beneficial in some way, but not intended.

Q: The overriding priority had shifted.

JICKLING: Local interests were not those which we were trying to support when we began it.

Q: Well we will come back to some of those thoughts. How did you find ICA as an organization to work with at that time?

JICKLING: ICA was to me top notch. I think AID suffered from becoming geographically split. When I came back to Washington in the late 60's, AID was trying to recover under Joel Bernstein a little bit of that spirit and technical excellence which it had had under ICA. ICA had focused on the technical fields: Agriculture, education, health, public administration, and a couple of others. They had the best people they could find world wide focusing on those areas. The problems had many things in common. AID, particularly in Latin America with the Alliance for Progress, tried to set itself up as almost an independent agency. It broke away from any technical supervision or control or standard setting, and focused on country specific programs and the region. Maybe it had some spirit. The Alliance for Progress had goals that were admirable and perhaps were useful, but I think as an organization, AID never recovered the technical excellence and emphasis that ICA had.

Q: Well that is something we'll want to explore further. Then you left the Washington office.

Assigned to USAID/Guatemala in public administration - 1961

JICKLING: Then I went overseas in 1961 to do the same kind of work. I worked with my counterpart in the government in Guatemala. The man had worked with me here in Washington in workshops on administrative management. He'd gone to study under Don Stone at Pittsburgh, a rather short three to six month course. Then he went back to head an office of what we would call organizational management, how to make things work in the government, how to streamline administrative systems, how to simplify work, how to make the files be responsive to the needs of the organization. He was my counterpart, and for five years we worked side by side trying to confront these problems in the immigration office, in the post office, in the customs house. In all the most difficult areas in the Guatemalan government we tried our best to simplify. We did films; we did training programs; we did all kinds of things to try to make things better, but in many cases we had very little impact.

Q: What was the situation in Guatemala when you were there?

JICKLING: We had just previous to that in 1954 supported the overthrow of a popular government which to our view was too left leaning. The Arbenz government with CIA help was replaced by Castillo Armas which was a setback in terms of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. It is a sad story which Stephen Schlesinger has written about as Bitter Fruit or Piero Gleijeses at Johns Hopkins has written a book about the same process, *Shattered Hope*. In other words we were living in the period, the early 60's that was the beginning of a 30 year period of military dominance, of a government which was more interested (and the United States was supportive of this) in anticommunism, of strong government to control the kinds of cold war concerns that we had. But it was not a government interested in the kinds of reforms the previous government, the Arbenz government, had set about to implement.

Q: Was the previous government a Communist government?

JICKLING: The previous government was communist in the sense that it was committed to social reform, to helping poor people, to all of the things which in theory the Alliance for Progress was committed to. This was a government which really was trying to do that. Whether or not it was communist with a big "C," it clearly had these kinds of social goals. The United States and John Dulles and the others just wouldn't tolerate it. We set about at a cost of \$20,000,000 and one American life to overthrow that government.

Q: Was it a threat to the United States or was it just that it was communist?

JICKLING: It was not a threat to the United States, but it was viewed as a Communist country and this was after Cuba. We were not going to have another Cuba. This dominated our foreign policy in Latin America for 30 years. Reagan was the extreme of this, but in the 1960's we were equally committed to helping anti-communists. If they were against communists, they were our friends and we were going to support them. People like Somoza. All the way through, Somoza and his father had been anti-communists and therefore we were supporting them.

Q: So we played a major role in the overthrow of the Arbenz government?

JICKLING: That was 1954. In the 1960's there was still very much the spirit of anti-communism. It wasn't so much the spirit of development or of helping people or improving the quality of life as it was creating a system that would somehow be able to resist the temptations of communism rather than the idea of a better life for a broad group.

Q: How did that affect the kind of program we had there?

JICKLING: The program was essentially the same. The emphasis during the earlier period had been on agriculture, education, and health. Public administration was added to it. We had an elaborate system in the 50's under Rockefeller who headed the program of the IIAA, Institute of Inter-American Affairs. It created what was known as "servicios." This is a very interesting experience that is little documented I think. In Latin America we created little ministries, parallel ministries in three fields: agriculture, education and health. People today look back on that, the old timers as the golden years in programs related to agriculture.

Q: Why did we create servicios?

JICKLING: We created servicios because we felt that it was difficult for us to work directly with the government because of their problems of lack of resources and personnel. They didn't have the quality personnel we wanted and the programs we wanted. The idea was sort of like American county agents, to create a demonstration project, to run a program properly with the proper resources and the right kind of people particularly in these priority areas. It had remarkable success. They did all kinds of things. For example, in education emphasizing rural education, not just city children and teacher training and adult literacy. It created little ministries that sooner or later ran into conflict with the basic ministry.

Q: How was the servicio structured and managed?

JICKLING: The servicio was a little cooperative organization with a Guatemalan or local director and a US director. It had a staff which complemented the ministry but in fact duplicated and often conflicted with the ministry. Above all, the friction was that the servicio was relatively well financed, with good supplies, good materials, and good people. The ministry continued with its mediocre ways so there was often conflict between the two. It wasn't always a model in the sense that the ministry people didn't follow the servicio. That system was abandoned in the 1960's. The notion of the Alliance for Progress was that you would have more of a cooperative approach, you would work together and you wouldn't set up separate and in a sense competing organizations.

Q: As a public administration expert, what was your view of servicios as an appropriate instrument?

JICKLING: We turned right around and under the project idea which came into vogue in the 60's, the projects did almost exactly the same thing. Still to this day we go in with a project, and the World Bank is even worse than we are, they set up a separate administrative group with separate standards in terms of the quality of people and resources that are available to administer the project. The project ends and the supporting infrastructure just disappears. So, the servicio experience had its problems,

but today project management has the same thing. I think in technical assistance we should abandon the project focus in development.

Q: Did you have a servicio in public administration in Guatemala?

JICKLING: No, what we had were comparable organizations. For example, in data processing, we would go into an organization or government and we would create a central data processing office. That office would have as its clients, the census people, the tax people, perhaps the customs people, and statistical people in other fields, and it would provide central services for these other fields. It was kind of a servicio, but it wasn't ever called that, and it caught on. In many countries such as in Bolivia where I worked later, Cenaco, was a central computer center, and became a center of excellence. It served as a pilot project introducing a new technology, computers for business operations and gradually expanded serving all of the government. Public administration never had servicios as such, but it created little offices like the office of organization methods which I worked in. We set up in almost every country that AID worked with around the world, an institute of public administration. This was a government organization; it was kind of like a servicio but it never had a US head. It always had a local head who set about to identify bottlenecks in administrative reform and develop training programs and publications and other consulting activities that would focus on making those systems work better.

Q: Well let's come back to those in a minute. You had an institute of public administration in Guatemala?

JICKLING: Yes! CDAP, the Public Administration Development Center. It still exists today under another name. It is now called the Institute of Public Administration, but it has the same basic focus.

Q: In your seven years in Guatemala, what were some of the major issues you had to address?

JICKLING: Rural poverty. We set up a task group because we didn't have an organization concerned with rural development. Agriculture was as much concerned with large farmers as with small farmers, for example the coffee growers or rubber production for export, but we were not concerned from a policy point of view or a program point of view with reaching rural people. We had programs like rural adult literacy or rural education that focused on them. Many of the programs like malaria control or potable water programs reached the rural people, but there was no integration of the activities. At that time one of the greatest emphases in Guatemala and a lot of other countries and the U.S. supported this and later the Peace Corps supported this was community development work. Community development became what we called later in the middle 1970's integrated rural development. At the community level, how do you get leadership and focus your resources on the local problems, whatever the felt needs are of the community. We had in Guatemala a task force. I served as the secretary which is the only real staff function there was because there were people from different fields. We met on a regular basis, and we talked about how to focus programs more effectively on what today we call rural poverty, how to help communities help themselves.

Q: Currently the concepts of rural development and community development have somewhat of a bad

name. How did you find it then? What did you work on? What issues did you have to deal with?

JICKLING: What we had to do was to find local leaders and how to encourage them to tackle local problems whether it was potable water or access roads or whatever. Resources were always limited. The problem was how could you focus the resources on community problems and get the community itself to provide the input to make it work. Local leaders were the key to that. Peace Corps volunteers came in, in the 60's in great numbers. They typically played that intermediate role between local communities' interests and external resources which could be from foreign aid, from private corporations, from international groups. It focused aid on particular community problems.

Q: What were some of the techniques you used to get this local interest and leadership?

JICKLING: One of the great stories is with the Loyola program. Loyola University, a Catholic organization in New Orleans, decided at the same time as the Pope was saying thou shalt, meaning community priests, should do good works and be concerned with this life, not just the life hereafter to their parishioners. Loyola said fine, let's train local leaders. They developed a program with our support. This was a time when Kennedy was President when it was really questionable whether we could support a Catholic institution. It was a major political decision, and they said yes we would. For five years or so, we worked with Loyola sending people from practically every Latin American country. I can talk about Guatemala particularly because I was there then. These trainees were picked to go to Loyola. They went for six or eight months and had a range of training focusing on community organization. The same kind of thing the poverty program was working on in the United States, the same methodology of identifying local leaders and training them. Typically in Guatemala, the trainees that went to Loyola, and let's say that 50-75 people went during those five years during the 60's were picked by the local priest. They often were schoolteachers, young bright people who often had been studying in secondary school in another town and had come back to the village. These were the potential leaders, not necessarily the older people, but the movers and shakers. They came to Loyola; they came back all fired up, but they came into an environment in Guatemala which was basically repressive and against change. This was a period when the government was in the hands of the military and they didn't really want education and development at the local level which would run contrary to the status quo. In the following 15 years, when we study the impact and the outcome of the Loyola program (we have never made a statistical study), we find that most of the trainees are dead today. They were killed because they were agitators in the terms of the powers that be. In terms of development, they were the ideal change agent, they were well selected, but that was the kiss of death for them.

Q: They were supported by AID?

JICKLING: Supported by it, financed by AID. When they came back, the AID infrastructure was very sensitive to how they could be supportive. Most of the governments like Guatemala had, at the Presidential level, an office of community development. It was concerned with organizing and focusing resources on these local problems in a very fluid way.

Q: By that time they were trying to get rid of the revolutionary groups?

JICKLING: The government was talking with two voices. One voice was saying help them. Let's do the kinds of things that will help local communities while the traditional and military powers, the powers that really counted were saying these are agitators and let's get rid of them. The governments of Latin America, and Guatemala we can use as an example, are deeply committed to this today. It is now called the Fondo de Inversion Social, FIS. Almost every country in Latin America has a FIS. It is supported fundamentally by the World Bank. It is directed at structural adjustment which means that poor people suffer with a lot of these market economy introductions and things which are being pushed by the World Bank and the international community generally. But also the World Bank's proper concern with poverty. The Fondo de Inversion Social, with World Bank funds coming into these same communities and saying what would you like to do. They help organize on a very decentralized way to support change. I happened to have been working with them this past year with one of their senior people on another project. I had a chance to go into the office. It is an amazing experience because they are just overwhelmed with people. Not bureaucrats, but private contractors. The wisdom of foreign aid today is you can't depend on a government bureaucracy to do these kinds of programs. What you do is say we are going to build schools in this area. Would you like to build schools? If so come in and give us your bid. We'll give you suggestions of plans and you give us your bid. We will build 50 schools if the communities will provide the labor, provide the site, not necessarily the supervision but at least the energy to get the school going and the request to the ministry to get a teacher there or even in some cases to have the community actually support the school by paying a teacher, a great revolution.

The fact is that there is a FIS program in almost every Latin American country today. I'm not sure how it is translated in English, but it is a community development social betterment program. It is carrying on that same tradition with the World Bank that the community development field did. As I was mentioning, in Guatemala in the 60's, AID had a rural development task force that was concerned on how to focus our programs on the same objectives.

Q: Do you have a feeling that the community development work you were involved in in those days created a conceptual base for what happened later or was everything that came later brand new, discarding what went before?

JICKLING: I have been working in foreign aid like you have, Haven, for 40 years. The reinvention of the same thing over and over with new labels is such a sad thing. The fact that the AID organization does not look back and see what has happened before and learn from that experience is a great tragedy. We reinvent the wheel over and over and part of it is the focus on projects. That is a mistake. We set out, and the other agencies I worked for, the IDB and the World Bank have too, they set up a program. Then they set up a project. They say in five years we are going to turn this aspect of the world around. Then they go in and they often have no interest in what has happened before. They just set up their goals and they try to measure the change and all the rest without looking back and comparing the experience. They face the same problems and they come out with very little long term impact. What they do is something concrete that they can point with pride that they have achieved something in three years or five years.

Q: Going back to your stay in Guatemala in that kind of a program, what were some of the lessons

you learned about what worked and what didn't work?

JICKLING: About three years ago they had a team that went back to Guatemala to look at that under a former mission director, Dave Lazar. I worked with them although they weren't anxious to have me either. They were interested in not being prejudiced by experience let's say. Nobody bothered with the facts. They were concerned with outcomes in Guatemala in rural development after 20-30 years what changes could be measured and what could be seen. I worked with them and I have noted down here some of the things I think were different in Guatemala. I tried to influence them. I don't think with too much success. It seems to me the outcomes of technical assistance which were positive successes in Guatemala were roads. The United States in WWII decided they would build a road down to the Panama Canal in case the Japanese threats along the Pacific coast increased. They wanted a land supply route to the Panama Canal. They set about with no restrictions on the funds. It was a blank check to build the Inter-American highway as a defense highway. That went right through the middle of Guatemala. It was still being built in the 1960's. Twenty years after it started it was still being paved and some parts were still being worked on because of difficult terrain. It was much easier in the long run to build it along the coast on a level route, but because of security interests, they decided to build it in the mountains which was ten times more difficult. That road led to a whole new approach to the highlands of Guatemala. It made them accessible, and the roads which led into it which are called farm to market roads, neighborhood roads made a tremendous difference in Guatemala. Communities were opened up and given access to markets which they had never had before because of the Inter-American highway and the feeder roads that came into it. Looking back on Guatemala, I don't think there is any question, roads were the number one achievement. They had all kinds of secondary consequences, unintended but beneficial which opened the communities to, for example, teachers. That road, the Inter-American highway today is an interesting case study. The number of teachers, we are talking about hundreds of teachers who want to live in the capital because of educational opportunities and other benefits for their families but who teach in the highlands in the communities. It is a commuter road. That Inter American highway is a commuter road with busses that bring people in to work in the city and take them back. We are talking about people commuting one or two hours, 50 miles and more. It also takes people out to teach in the local schools or to be health workers or village community development people.

The roads have had secondary consequences of tremendous benefit, broad scale development and income generation because it brings into the city cut flowers, strawberries and other products that go out every day by airplanes. For Guatemala, these are what we now call non-traditional exports, which is another emphasis of foreign aid. The roads provide the basis for those products to be broadly produced and to come out of the country. Roses for example, there is a whole story of roses and what it has meant to Guatemala. Cut roses are produced within a two hour radius of the airport which is a third of the country. Every morning they come in boxes. They are cut at night and are on that airplane at 7:00 A.M. They are in Miami at noon and in Philadelphia in the afternoon. The next day, the second day, they are being sold throughout the whole Atlantic seaboard of the United States. These roses sell for a dollar apiece. They are produced for ten cents. There is a lot of profit along the way, but it is a good example of a non-traditional export. Back to the outcome or the beneficial thing, roads I think are number one.

Number two is water, infrastructure again. Water is the universal need of rural communities, and so often the input is not at great expense. It could be other simple technologies, wells occasionally, but more often it is a surface source that comes to a village. The village identifies a source, and the problem is how to get it to the village. Water is number two.

Construction is equally important although lots of times health posts are never used or they are not used adequately or schools are not properly staffed or what goes on inside the school is essentially what went on before and not much improved. School construction, health post construction, water systems, roads, electric plants, hydroelectric dams, and other basic infrastructure are major projects which AID doesn't invest in as much anymore, but the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank came along and picked up these projects, which it seems to me have made the most impact on modernizing Guatemala.

The other aspects of technical assistance and interchange were much less effective, for example what goes on in the schools. We have constantly, since the days of the *servicio* in Guatemala, been concerned about the quality of rural education. I was on a task force earlier this year in Guatemala in bi-lingual education. The Indian population which is half the population of Guatemala think it is very important and are all for it in any way they can. But again, the governing people, the Ministry of Education, do not give it the same importance. What is needed is, in their view, the integration of the nation, not separation. It is kind of like the vote recently in California against bi-lingual education. So, a lot of the things we pushed have never really been accepted. It is partly a cultural thing. It is partly a thing that Indians who, don't speak Spanish, and that is really a definition of an Indian, not how they dress or what they do, but that they don't speak Spanish, don't count. It is a tragic thing in terms of the waste of human resources, in terms of the inability of the country to integrate and become a more unified and effective social group.

We had a major effort in Guatemala in preventive medicine to eradicate malaria. We are talking a major investment over many years. Malaria is as bad in some areas as it was 50 years ago. The mosquitoes have become resistant, and have been difficult to control. Family planning is the same thing. We have put in, in the last 20 years in Guatemala, considerable resources in support of family planning. I had a chance to work about five years ago in a programming exercise trying to measure results of our foreign aid today. What are the results of our investment in foreign assistance in family planning? We spent days literally trying to pinpoint the figures to send to Washington to say what our results would be. We are talking about in five years, that we would go from 32 to 34 percent acceptors. A trivial amount with major expenditures. In other words, the impact of family planning, in spite of our most ambitious efforts, were not going to reach more than a small fraction of rural women.

Q: Why was it not more effective? Was it a cultural block?

JICKLING: The problem of the lack of progress in family planning relates to a whole series of things like the education of women. These are much longer term investments than just providing birth control methods. The program has never in countries like Guatemala, reached the great majority of women. More than half of the child producing women are in rural areas, and they are subject to a whole series

of cultural values and lack of access to family planning services, which really prevents the programs from having much impact. For the last 20 years, effective family planning has been the number one priority in countries like Guatemala.

Q: Supported by government?

JICKLING: Supported by the government nominally, but not necessarily by the church and community organizations and people with traditional values. It has had very limited impact.

Q: So what you are saying is that infrastructure was effective but that social services were less so. What were the public administration issues? Public administration must have been at the heart of this dilemma.

JICKLING: No question. Effectiveness of public sector management is a constant problem. Its successes have been in, as I mentioned, computers and data processing and advanced technologies. To a lesser extent personnel systems, civil service, merit systems. There has been remarkable progress in creating systems to get better people into government and to reward them better. It is not adequate, but we have tried very hard in that area. I think that much of what we did in public administration had very little impact. I was asked to go back to Guatemala because I had worked for seven years there and try to measure the long term impact of public administration programs. I pointed to the two areas, the application of computers and personnel work as the most successful. Personnel work related especially to training, the institute of public administration which we'd helped start.

Q: Were there specific public administration issues related to the rural development, community development interests that you dealt with?

JICKLING: Yes. I hesitate to think of ways in which we made an impact. I think the real problem of community development, and it continues today, is the fact that the people in most of the rural communities in Guatemala are Indians. These are people whom the powers that be, the government, has not really given a priority. There is only a token interest in their programs.

Q: Were there specific techniques in public administration you were trying in the community development effort that worked or didn't work?

JICKLING: We have had with the Guatemalans success in isolated cases. For example, local government, and that is related to community development. I worked in the 60's on creating a municipal association that might help to bring pressure on the central government to provide more resources, and also increase the sense of professionalism among city managers. They are called municipal secretaries there, but are the staff under the elected mayor. We have had a support role in creating a system in which more of the national resources are going to local government to provide infrastructure, streets, water, markets, slaughterhouses and the typical municipal functions. Before it depended on happenstance of a beneficial central government making gestures, giving here and giving there, and very limited local resources. In the last 20 years Guatemala has moved toward what we call revenue sharing by which an earmarked portion of the central government's budget is

transferred to the municipalities for public works, not to pay the employees, but for water systems and other public works, and those funds are administered by the local government. This is a major shift in power that is taking place. We've supported it. For example, in 1968, we helped fund a conference in a village called Panajachel and it is still called the "Declaration of Panajachel." The old timers cite it as a landmark step. The declaration stated that municipalities should be considered as partners in development. They were not there just for law and order which was their traditional role. They are there in order to help people help themselves, to be partners in the development. It is an interesting concept, which has been the model for people who are pushing for decentralization in government, the shifting of public functions to local government.

Q: Were there any specific programs you dealt with to help municipal development?

JICKLING: First we helped form the municipal association in which the municipal leaders came together to form a more effective political group to put pressure on the central government. We sent municipal secretaries who were the administrative staff to the United States and elsewhere to organized training in what the possibilities were in local government development, in decentralization, broader local responsibility, and collecting local taxes to pay for this. These efforts have motivated municipal staff to think more broadly, to have a broader vision of the potential role of local government. We also worked specifically on local tax administration systems, particularly the property tax which is now being decentralized to the municipalities. We did it in terms of helping rural municipalities to better map their properties as a basis for better property tax collection. We worked on what are called cadasters which are property tax bases which help local governments. We worked in other areas which would help the municipalities become more effective in local development activity. This basically supports the same thing that community development tried to do but with emphasis on doing it through the local government structure.

Q: Were there other initiatives you undertook while you were in Guatemala?

JICKLING: Tourism, and there is no question that tourism is the number one potential for that country. It is a small country about the size of West Virginia with a topography kind of like West Virginia with a tremendous potential for tourism. Poverty like West Virginia and violence deters tourism which is an intractable problem. In the 60's, I began as a hobby during my free time, touring the country myself, writing it up for the American community in tour guides and things like that, and then working with the tourist office. All of this was outside my regular responsibility, but it was a very serious hobby for me, working on how to promote tourism for Guatemala. Except for the law and order issue, which is worse today than it was last year or the year before. Other than that, I don't think there is any area that can potentially provide as many resources for Guatemala as tourism. We spend half the year today in a little village called Antigua. We bought a home there while we were in Guatemala. It is a major tourist attraction. It was the colonial capital, a little Williamsburg, preserved as it was in the 18th century. I have worked with the public and private people in developing tourism, developing handouts, materials, maps, and all kinds of things that help to promote Antigua as an attractive tourist destination.

Q: Were there some other things you did to promote tourism? Did you have a government program

that you helped set up?

JICKLING: There is a government program, a Guatemalan tourist institute that is very important. I published a little booklet identifying who the saints were on the facades of the colonial churches. Every saint on a church was picked for a very specific didactic purpose. He or she is there because of the message that church wants to communicate to the village. I am very interested in publications or anything that will help promote Antigua as a more interesting and attractive tourist destination.

Q: Did you have government capacity to do this with you?

JICKLING: Yes. There is a national tourist promotion office which was doing reasonably good work.

Q: From your initiatives?

JICKLING: No. AID supported tourism from time to time, for example, by building roads and providing access to some of the more interesting tourist facilities. In fact, it has never been a priority, and AID, official AID, has said this should not be a priority. Somehow there is a feeling that this is not an appropriate use of public funds. I think that is very short sighted. The National Geographic has been much more supportive of what they call the Ruta Maya, the circuit of places to visit to study the ancient Mayan culture which is one important part of tourist promotion in Guatemala. National Geographic is doing it with Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico to promote the idea that tourists should be able to easily visit these different expressions of this magnificent pre-Colombian civilization, the Maya.

Q: Interesting. Are there other dimensions of your work there that you haven't touched on?

JICKLING: We love Guatemala and we go back now every year. We've been going for 30 years. This gives us a perspective on Guatemala including the different aspects of Guatemalan development. I have just finished a paper that I will present later this month in Chicago. It analyzes the mayors of Guatemala City, what they have done for the quality of life in the city and how they relate to national politics. It is a fascinating subject because the capital city, even though it is a major city 2,000,000 people today with a huge metropolitan area, yet it plays a secondary role in national politics. It doesn't have any real independence from the central government. It is struggling constantly to provide better services. Only now after 50 years of "municipal autonomy" is it getting the kind of support from the central government that it should have, resources and support for the kind of infrastructure that a city of two million people need.

Q: What were some of the main evolutions in development terms that you have seen in Guatemala over 40 years?

JICKLING: The negative aspect first which is a constant problem is acceptance of the Indian as a human being worthy of support. It is like the whole area of women in development, the notion that women provide a resource, a potential for development, of contributing to development which can

only be achieved if they have their own capacities developed. The Indian population is exactly the same. Until Guatemala accepts the fact that half of their people have been essentially excluded from the kind of developmental services that would enable them to achieve their potential and contribute to development, the country will always be held back. That, I think, is the number one problem.

The second problem is resources. The fact that to get change, to get development, you need central resources. The tax collection record of Guatemala is abysmal. It is I guess after Haiti, the least productive in terms of providing resources for public sector programs. People just won't pay their taxes, so that is an equally difficult problem.

In terms of positive change, there are just all kinds of change that have come about as a result of urbanization. Guatemala City was a half a million when we went there in 1961. It is two million today. With urbanization comes all kinds of modernization. There is exposure with things that come with television and radio and all of the things that a dynamic major urban center create. It is a dangerous environment in many respects, but at the same time is also a highly productive area. It is an area in which there are all kinds of initiatives, innovations and experimentation, things which never existed before. In other words, urbanization and modernization are two sides of the same coin. As much as we talk about rural development, most of the major changes in development in Guatemala like growing roses for export or other innovations have come from urban people who see the countryside as a place to invest, to make money, not to improve the quality of life in the rural area; although, that is a secondary consequence. It comes about because the people in the city have a little extra money and are willing to take a chance to invest in certain new initiatives.

Q: Have there been any revolutionary changes in the rural areas since you were there?

JICKLING: The rural areas have changed because of investment in infrastructure. The roads have given them access to markets. The rural areas have also changed as a result of health and educational programs. For example, in 1976 there was a devastating earthquake in the whole central region of the country. AID with other donors went in and helped to rebuild the infrastructure of those communities. They have clearly improved their schools, their health posts, their municipal buildings and other public buildings, so because of the devastation of a major earthquake, there has been a major investment in infrastructure that would not have happened without the earthquake. The earthquake was a terrible thing, but it was a therapeutic thing. It causes weak buildings and poor buildings to fall down. The good buildings stay, but it causes you to rebuild and to create a better physical infrastructure. It is one of the tragedies of development.

Q: What about the changes in the public administration capacity of the government which is the area which you were working on?

JICKLING: I think there have been some improvements, but not much. While I was there in the 60's we worked with the post office, with immigration, with the customs house, with tax offices. Many of these offices are still hopeless bureaucracies, truly hopeless. Why haven't they changed, why haven't they improved and become more user friendly is an intricate question related to leadership and corruption. The fact that if you have a complex system, lots of people benefit because people will pay

to get things handled promptly. So, corruption is part of the problem. Also the fact that leaders haven't pushed for user friendly systems. There are some innovations in tax collection. In this small town where we lived, the mayor has reformed the office. In the city hall, he has made it so the lines are much shorter. They have tried very hard to make it easier for people to pay taxes. You don't have to wait in line forever; you can get attention. You may get a tax bill that is computer printed. A complete new initiative so that in a sense you don't have to go and wait in line or beg to pay your taxes. These are the kinds of changes that are heartening to see, and they take place. They don't always take place because of foreign aid. They take place because an organization like IBM or others were ready to sell the organization a machine that will produce that kind of a billing. They convinced the organization that you will make more money if you provide your clients with a bill so they know what they have to pay. You do it promptly, and you create an image of being a responsive government.

Q: What about the political level, what we now call governance? That seems to be still at the heart of the situation and problem in Guatemala. How has that changed over the 40 years?

JICKLING: Since 1986, there have been democratically elected governments in Guatemala. There has been a pulling back of military domination. The governments have been increasingly responsive to local needs and development. The current government, the Arzu government, is an amazingly effective government in many respects with what is called the "peace process." This process brought an end to a 30 year civil war and laid out a whole series of very ambitious objectives, for example, the integration of the Indian, respect for the Indian. It is certainly a step in the right direction, but it is a step with a huge set of problems. The Arzu government and the previous three governments have been moving in the right direction. There is a real prospect that the military will stay in the barracks, not for sure, but a good prospect they will stay in the barracks and the government will be succeeded by a civilian elected government. There will be an election next year, and the mayor of Guatemala City, probably the best mayor they have had in 50 years, is the insider to be elected as the next president. The current president is the former mayor of Guatemala City who did an outstanding job in administrative reform for the government of Guatemala City. For example, reducing the lines for waiting to pay taxes and other aspects of the administrative management of the city. Their current mayor is even better, and he is more human and more effective in many ways. He is the insider to succeed the president, so I think there is real hope.

Q: What occurred to cause the military to go back to the barracks? Why did they suddenly decide to give up the role?

JICKLING: They found that a long civil war was not getting them anywhere. It took years to get the negotiations between the rebel groups and the military to agree to what is called a peace process. They agreed to begin to attack all of these problems that the rebels have been trying to get on the agenda for 30 years. It was signed in December of '96, and now we are two years into that process. The military has accepted a secondary role. Even more important is the notion that policing of the country should become a civilian and professional operation. We haven't talked about public safety, but all through this process AID at the beginning in the 60's was very concerned with the policing function and public safety.

Q: We had a program?

JICKLING: Everywhere we had a public safety program. It made a limited impact, but it didn't affect the fact that the military in Guatemala was still doing the principal policing function. They did it right up until recently, and they still do it on occasion. Now the problem is how to create a professional, independent, civilian police force. The Spanish government is helping them do that.

Q: What were we doing in public safety all these years?

JICKLING: Well, we supplied them with equipment for one. We supplied them with training. We brought their leaders here to the old Car Barn in Georgetown which was the Office of Public Safety's training facility. I don't know how many, but let's say from 20 to 50 police officials over the years came to that facility from Guatemala and learned about modern policing techniques. The AID police advisor in Guatemala in the 60's was a good friend of mine. He was from Guam and had a Spanish name, although he didn't speak Spanish. He was an interesting guy, Christostomo. We didn't drink scotch and it was always limited because Johnson at the time wanted us to buy American and not foreign merchandise. Our commissary had a quota of scotch. We gave our quota to this police advisor. He didn't drink much either, but when he did, and this is an interesting technical assistance technique, he provided the police officers who came by his house any time to have a drink. That's where our scotch went. It was interesting because through that, he had access to the police in an informal way that he never would have had as a regular advisor. That was his approach to making friends with the police. What changes he achieved or what happened as a result, I don't know. I think that our interest in police at that time was very much a cold war thing, that we wanted access to the police for intelligence purposes.

The Vietnam experience with the Michigan State University police program is an example of this. It was infiltrated with CIA. We felt this was a way we could keep track of what was happening in the country through the intelligence part of the police function. I think Christostomo was never directly involved in the sense that he didn't work for the CIA, but I think there is no question that the CIA office in Guatemala, of which I knew nothing other than they were in the top floor of the Embassy, probably interviewed Christostomo every week to debrief him on what he was finding out, but he was not a direct employee of the CIA. I'm sure that whiskey helped to have him find out about things they were doing. Do you remember "Z" and the story about the public safety people training the local people in torture methods and police brutality in Uruguay. I don't think we were involved in that in Guatemala. I think they were more than capable of doing that on their own. I just know that we had a public safety program until it became a political liability. The Spanish government is now doing a major job in Guatemala in working with the police. A professional civilian police force, everyone agrees, is a very useful goal. I think, Haven, the number one problem in Guatemala today, in spite of all these other efforts and programs, is public safety, basic law and order, you have public safety, or you are not going to have a bright future for Guatemala.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Embassy during your time there?

JICKLING: I didn't in Guatemala because I was a junior officer. I did more later on in Bolivia and

Nicaragua.

Q: Let's just talk about Guatemala now.

JICKLING: I did in subsequent appointments because I was a senior both in Bolivia and Nicaragua. That is another story. In Guatemala, my experience was mostly social. I got to know the Ambassador socially, and we talked informally. Only occasionally would they talk about things in which I was interested, but their staff members became close personal friends, and through them, I had an idea of what the Embassy was doing. The political officer, John Dreyfus, was a close personal friend, we were neighbors and our boys played baseball together, and our wives knew each other. Through John Dreyfus, the only American in my experience of 40 years in Guatemala, who learned all the verses of the National Anthem, which are always sung at every public occasion. We'd always attend these ceremonies and wiggle our lips, but we don't know more than the chorus of their National Anthem. Here is a political officer who not only knew every verse, but he knew every political leader, actual and future in Guatemala. It's a wonderful story. I admired him so much, and he was a delightful person. He was like this public safety advisor. He didn't have an open bar, but he was hobnobbing with all the young political leaders all the time and knew what was going on. During one of the recent political difficulties about 10 years ago, he was called back to Guatemala to talk to his informants and give the Embassy a report. I had a chance to talk to him later. His report was absolutely ignored; no one had any interest in it; although, they did pay for him to go back and check up on what was happening. He since has died.

Q: Did you ever have a sense that the Embassy was giving you or your mission political directives as to what you should or shouldn't do?

JICKLING: Yes. The Embassy was supportive of certain things. For example I was interested in decentralization, local government development. The Mission Director, at the time was a real problem. I won't even mention his name. He just was difficult to work with. The Ambassador came into the discussions of the program and said let's do it. In other words, he went around the Mission Director to talk to me to say this is something that is worth doing, and let's do it.

Q: You mean the decentralization business.

JICKLING: Yes.

Q: Why didn't the mission support it?

JICKLING: The mission was giving nominal approval, but in fact was raising all kinds of problems, and by the manner in which the Mission Director was operating was creating really big problems in negotiating agreements on particular activities with the government. The Ambassador came to me personally and said let's move the program forward.

Q: Was this a substantive issue or just a personality...

JICKLING: A personality issue. This was a Mission Director who knew the answers and he was going to tell the people how to do it. He told them in a very loud voice in the presence of subordinates in a way that was so counterproductive. It was a tragic story.

Q: Well, we may want to go back to Guatemala later, but let's move on. You left there after seven years. What year was it and where did you move to?

Returned USAID/Washington to the Development Administration Office - 1968

JICKLING: In 1968 I came back to Washington and worked on policy matters. From 1968 to 1971, I was in the central bureau which was called the Technical Assistance Bureau. It was very weak because the agency at that time, as it is today, was dominated by its geographic regions and country offices. But, this was an effort to try to recreate the concept of ICA, of having a stronger technical office concerned with what was then called development administration. I worked on the policies related to decentralization, local government and administrative reform which were the areas I was most familiar with. We had limited success, but mostly it was creating policy papers. I was responsible for trying to get a consensus. We worked with the people in the regional bureaus concerned about programs related to technical assistance and Development Administration. We tried to get agreement on what we should be doing in fields such as statistics, tax administration, or customs administration. To try to get them to agree on something was difficult. Even to get them to come to a meeting was a major problem. It was an organizational problem of a highly fractured AID in the 1960's.

Q: Why did the name change from public administration to development administration?

JICKLING: It was a serious attempt to create the concept of being new. There was for a long time a feeling that public administration was concerned with the traditional areas of personnel, finance, revenue, statistics, and supply. These were the traditional areas of public administration. To create the notion of development administration was a new label with the idea that you did these things but in terms of how you achieved development objectives. In other words, how do you look at health, not just in terms of family planning techniques, but in administrative terms like outreach and effectiveness. How did you approach education or other development fields from an administrative point of view? So, it was taking the same approaches but focusing on development objectives. It was a new label. The wine in the bottles was the same, but the idea was to relabel it to be something that was more relevant to the development field.

Q: Was there more of a sector orientation?

JICKLING: Yes. Sector oriented in the sense that every sector had its administrative problems, and everyone recognized it. During this time we worked closely with the public health people on a whole series of things. The health people were very interested in outreach and effectiveness.

Q: What kinds of things did you work with them on?

JICKLING: We worked in evaluation. I mentioned we went around the world looking at health programs like the one in Pakistan. We were looking at what was effective and how to help the public health people in missions become more effective in organizing to carry out their activities.

Q: What kinds of things did you find should be undertaken or were supporting in the health field?

JICKLING: In the case of Pakistan it was one of unintended consequences. Just to say that you often have impacts you don't anticipate, but I think in general, the approach was to help with the problem of having a clear mission. It was the beginnings of strategic management, the idea that if you want to have a program like malaria control or family planning or anything else, you need to think in strategic terms. Looking at the broad picture, what are the resources you have; what are the objectives you have, and how do you relate the two. These were the kinds of concerns that were introduced into the sector in the name of development administration.

Q: Apart from Pakistan, did you do that in any...

JICKLING: No we were just looking in that case at what had happened before. There were other cases we did. I came out to Ghana while you were there. This was in that same period. We were working with the Ghanaian government in organizing support to local government. The purpose was decentralization, supporting local government. And then it was a question of strategy, how to provide the resources, the training, the kinds of support that would enable local government to perform better.

Q: What did you help organize?

JICKLING: In Ghana we helped design a project. There was a local staff concerned with these things, but they brought in outsiders to work together to create a program which would support innovation in local government administration.

Q: What kind of innovation are you talking about?

JICKLING: Being sensitive to local needs, being sensitive to community pressures, being sensitive to resource opportunities, to tax collection, being concerned about how resources were obtained, how they were controlled. The whole problem of financial management in local administration, plus personnel selection and training. The administrative techniques which would contribute to stronger local government.

Q: What was the reception to this approach to development administration in the agency at that time?

JICKLING: In the agency generally, I think it was generally positive. The biggest problem in development administration was the role of central technical assistance policy making. People in AID were not about to give any great emphasis on a cross sectoral, cross geographic technical fields.

Q: They were both cross geographic and cross sectoral so you had both interests?

JICKLING: Right. It was very difficult and with relatively little success. Development administration also began to fade out, and public sector management became a new label for much of the same material. This was in the 70's and 80's. It was a successor to development administration, the notion that you are concerned with how resources are managed in the public sector whatever the specific program was.

Q: Did any of the bureaus have a development administration unit or staff?

JICKLING: They all had people concerned with some aspect of development administration. It was just that they had other labels. They might be a program officer. They might be an officer concerned with a technical program like malaria control but concerned with the development administration aspects. They might be in completely another area like education and not necessarily called development administration but being concerned with the effectiveness of assignment of resources and use of resources within host country organizations assigned to that field.

Q: What were some of the things you worked on directly during your time in the Technical Assistance Bureau?

JICKLING: On policy papers; I remember ones particularly related to decentralization which was a new term for AID at that time. It was local government with a new twist.

Q: This is under which administration?

JICKLING: This is 1968, Washington, and Joel Bernstein was the head of the Technical Assistance Bureau. Jack Koteen was head of development administration. I don't remember who the director was. I remember vividly Dan Parker of Parker Pen - as Administrator of AID - because I was in a meeting with him. He was an impressive guy, but I think that was a little bit later. I don't remember the hierarchy although I would recognize the director's name.

Q: Well, you were working on policy papers; what were these?

JICKLING: The policy papers as I mentioned were very difficult to get agreement among these disperse groups concerned with different regions and different functional areas. I don't remember any great successes, but we had a very able group: Ed Rizzo, Ken Kornher, Jack Koteen, and a couple of others. There were five or six of us. We were constantly moved around. We served in five or so different locations in Washington. They stick in my mind because they were all different landmark places, but it also to me indicated that we were peripheral and we never really found a function or a mission or acceptance in the system. Public administration as a title became a non-word. No one talked about public administration.

Q: Why was it in such disrepute, the lack of interest?

JICKLING: I'm not sure except that it was felt at that time that it did not play a significant role. Public administration was a technique like community development that had been tried and had been

less than successful. It wasn't an agency priority, and that came through to us. We abolished public administration officers. I went from that Washington position to a public administration position in Bolivia, and it was one of the last ones we had. There were to my knowledge, only three or four public administration advisors in all of Latin America where ten years before there were 50. It was a shrinking or disappearing phenomenon; although, many of the same people were around under other labels.

Q: What were some of the issues on which you were trying to get a consensus? The policy aspects, not just areas of interest.

JICKLING: Many of them related to what would later be called strategic management. Jack Koteen went on to write a best seller on strategic management. It is now in its second edition. It goes back to the notion that we don't need to talk about public administration; what we need to talk about is clear thinking. I was teaching at this time both at George Washington University in their evening program and at the University of Maryland. Alice Rivlin, who is now becoming head of the D.C. Control Board, had just written a book about it. It was called common sense applied to administration. Simple, direct thinking about what resources you have, what your goals are and how they relate together. How do you sequence activities in such a way as to be most effective. Remember PERT? That was a Project Tracking System. It was very much in vogue at the time. It said as you think about your objectives, think about the intermediate steps and the sequence and how they are related in order to get to your objective. It was a system that had been developed in the Navy in order to meld submarines and missiles together. Rickover and others had pushed the PERT technique and it was tied to computers. For Development Administration people, it was called system analysis. It was the current vogue and all of these same people who had been called public administration advisors were trying to do for development were trying to apply systems techniques, systems analysis. I think of it as the kind of sequencing that took place in PERT. It was the "common sense" Alice Rivlin referred to. Incidentally, she also was an intern under Don Stone at ECA. I admire her because she is now number two in the Federal Reserve Board, but she also was taking on this DC Control Board. A remarkable woman. She represents these same values applied to the central government and to our local government. I look forward to seeing how she works with Tony Williams (D.C. mayor-elect). The point is, we are talking about a new approach using much of the antecedents from the old public administration. In the academic field, public administration was disappearing as a label during this time. Systems analysis and public sector management and other names were coming to the fore. They were concerned with what I consider the fundamentals, relating resources to the objectives, sequencing activities, trying to apply common sense to management problems.

Q: What was the problem with getting a policy paper agreed to on this approach?

JICKLING: Because there were these people with different audiences and different perspectives trying to agree on something. Decentralization is a good example. How could local government help an education program? How could it help a health program. For example, in most of the countries where we worked, education is a central government function. How do you get the local government to get more involved not just in school construction but with school maintenance and maybe with school instructional materials. Eventually helping with the salaries of teachers. That is a big cost,

hiring and paying teachers. That is the kind of question that development administration or this systems approach was applying to local government, the policy of local government and its relationship to a sector like education. Incidentally, I was just last year back in Nicaragua looking at the decentralization of education. They have made major achievements in helping communities organize in a way to contribute, not just peripherally, but centrally to rural schools. Of course, that is part of the U.S. tradition from way back. We have local school districts and local school support. It is a new thing to a lot of developing countries.

Q: What happened to the concern with personnel systems and financial systems?

JICKLING: They became supportive to sector development in the new focus. They did not become a separate field. We did not have advisors going out to look at classification systems that we had before. We did not have people going out to look at pay systems. We did not have people going out working on specific techniques, but we might well have someone looking at what was called escalifon, classification of teachers for pay purposes. Whether or not teachers in a rural school system who have a certificate should be paid more and if so, how much more than one who just learns on the job without having any certificate from an institution. How do you relate teaching skills to certificates, credentials to pay scales? It is a very interesting educational problem because you want to use pay as an incentive for people to study and become better prepared. You also want to get people to come in even if they don't have a certificate where there is a need in a rural community where you can't get a certified teacher. So the problems are central to the personnel aspects of education. Teachers, next to police, are the largest single group of government employees in most countries. Paying teachers is something which in most countries gets major attention. It is an incentive to get people to go into teaching, to get them to be better teachers, and to get them to be locally responsive. For example, teachers who speak the local language. Should this be a priority? Sometimes the central ministry says we don't want people who speak the local language to go to that community. We want them to go somewhere else so students will learn the national language. As against others who say well, what you really want to do is get teachers in the community who speak the local language to help the kids who come in who don't know the national language. So you want a local language speaker to help the children make the transition to the national language. How pay systems and recruitment systems relate to those issues is a good example of how personnel techniques relate directly to educational improvement techniques.

Q: Would you say then there was an interest in the pay systems and classification and procurements? You said these were all problems to be addressed under different sector contexts. We had never really abandoned the original public administration agenda.

JICKLING: Absolutely, and the last 20 years when I have worked from time to time as a consultant, over and over, I find the missions and the foreign assistance people dealing with exactly the same problems without the label of public administration but with the need for the same skills. The demand is substantially the same for the better use of resources, better management, better organizational efforts, whatever the purposes are.

Q: What was our role in public administration institutes? I think we helped create many of them,

didn't we?

JICKLING: Yes. Every country in Latin America and most countries around the world had an institute of public administration supported by AID. The one that I can cite as the most successful of all is in Brazil. It is one that I have worked with off and on over the past 20 years, and it is specifically oriented toward local government. In other words a central training institute focusing on local government success and management. It is called IBAM, the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM). It is a wonderful case study in itself because it was strongly supported by AID. It started in the 60's. AID came in and built it a building because again, very often that is the easiest thing we can do. We built them a building, and IBAM had an inspired leader, one of these men that you find from time to time. He now is the "dean" of local government development in Latin America, Lordello De Mello. For 25 years, De Mello was the head of IBAM. He not only had a beautiful building, a temple; so often we build these beautiful buildings and not much happens in them. In contrast, this was an organization that followed the model of a series of public administration agencies that began in Chicago in the 30's in the United States. Don Stone was one of the major innovators. It was called 13-13, 13-13 East 60th Street. A series of professional organizations concerned with improving management in public works, in personnel, in tax collection, in a whole range of fields. They served as the model. None of them were government sponsored; they were private sector. They functioned as professional associations, with a consulting role and a non-profit business concept. IBAM used that model very successfully. It is one of the great success stories of public administration overseas. It has served not only for Brazil, but it has worked in Mozambique because of the Portuguese language but also in virtually every country in Latin America providing technical assistance, helping local governments improve specific systems like garbage disposal and tax collection, budgeting and personnel.

There is a lot to be learned from other cities on, for example, how to collect garbage. There is a famous example in one of the cities in Brazil which provided free plastic bags for all poor people. They could pick up a plastic bag, a typical garbage bag. If they filled it with garbage and brought it to a collection point, they would get a bus ticket that is good for a ten cent ride on the local city bus. For them, that was an important incentive to pick up garbage. That is the kind of interchange of experience that IBAM fostered, sharing about systems that work.

Tomorrow, we have an election in Washington, and one of the principal things the mayoral candidates are talking about are cleaner streets. That is a universal problem. IBAM is a success story of the institutes of public administration, handling problems like that. It is funded in part by grants from foreign donors and Brazilian government agencies. It also sells its services. For a fee, it goes out to help a community with a certain problem to get resources and to solve its own problems. It has continued for 30 years now as a model public sector management improvement institution.

Q: Was there any particular American institution associated with it?

JICKLING: Ed Rizzo, an AID advisor, enabled IBAM to build that building. He was the public administration advisor in Brazil and got the money, a million dollars to build the IBAM building. That story is worth telling and what happened as a result of it. AID support was significant, but even more

important was Brazilian interest in making it work.

Q: There wasn't any university or technical assistance organization that provided staff?

JICKLING: They had looked to the International City Management Association, ICMA, which is a counterpart organization in the United States for certain guidance, but has never had a formal organizational relationship. I believe they also had a cooperative agreement with the University of Southern California (USC).

Q: Funded by AID?

JICKLING: Henry Reining at USC, the same man that backstopped the program in Iran that we mentioned in the 50's and 60's, also worked with IBAM with AID support. Lordello De Mello had graduated from USC. He was a Brazilian who had served in the U.S. military in WWII. He came out of service with the GI bill, and used it to study management at the University of Southern California. Then he went back to Brazil and became a legend in terms of his impact on public sector management in Brazil. The IBAM he created is the most successful institute for public management improvement in all of Latin America.

Q: What happened to some of the other institutes?

JICKLING: Most of them still exist in one form or another. They tended to become limited in their scope. Very often they focused on secretarial functions rather than management functions. There is always a need for secretaries and files management, but it can become all absorbing. So, the institutes become sometimes clerical training centers. Often, the young people would join the public sector, get good skills training, and leave for the private sector. Computer skills, for example, are one of the biggest needs in training public sector managers. Training in computer skills is a ticket to leave and go to the outside, so there is a constant brain drain from these institutes. Not only how not to focus unduly on clerical skills, but to address broader management problems. Their impact often depends on salary levels, opportunities in the private sector and so many other things beyond their control. Beyond IBAM, I have trouble remembering a public administration institute that has had a significant impact. The one in Guatemala is marginal and continues 30 years later, doing a reasonable job, but not a remarkable job. In the 80's I spent two years setting up a regional local government training center in Quito, Ecuador under the Dutch government to serve Latin America, so I know how difficult it is in Latin America to get these training institutes to have a real impact.

Q: Are there any other dimensions of your work with the Technical Assistance Bureau in development administration that you want to refer to?

JICKLING: Those two years are not a significant part of my career. I remember a delightful group of people in the Technical Assistance Bureau. They worked in the technical fields: agriculture, education, health, public administration, maybe a couple of more. Perhaps the greatest impact of the Bureau was in pushing family planning as a worldwide priority field.

Q: Did a policy paper eventually emerge?

JICKLING: They all eventually came out. The decentralization work, for example, led to a series of centrally funded projects.

Q: There were several policy papers then.

JICKLING: There were many policy papers and follow-up projects in selected areas. Ken Kornher would remember these better than I do, because he stayed on for a career in that same office. Your wife, Haven (Jeanne North), followed Ken in the same basic function.

Q: Well, let's go on. Then you went back overseas to Bolivia.

**New assignment in USAID/Bolivia as
head of public administration and education - 1971**

JICKLING: We were in Bolivia from 1971 until 1975. I say we because this was very much a family experience in all these assignments as you know. For me to talk professionally, I constantly think about my own family. My wife was a fourth grade teacher in the American School wherever we went. She got off the airplane and went to work the next day. She was in constant demand where ever she went. I went to Guatemala three months early because they needed her there the first of September. I was supposed to go through language training and come at Christmas time. My boss, the head of public administration, was also chairman of the local American school board, and he needed a fourth grade teacher. I got immediate orders to leave for Guatemala on August 15, so she could go to work on September 1. It is part of our family story.

We went to Bolivia, it is a joke but it was a high point in my career. It was a remarkable experience. I felt that I had never been in a country where I had as much job satisfaction. I enjoyed my work so much and our family enjoyed the country. The Bolivians were just delightful to work with. Guatemalans are reserved. In five or seven years in Guatemala, at the most, we were in five Guatemalan homes. In one week in Bolivia, we were in five Bolivian homes. We were in constant social contact with local people.

Q: What was your position?

JICKLING: I was head of public administration and then head of education. The two functions were combined about 1973. Public administration was phasing out at that time, and education was increasingly important, so I did both jobs. I headed about 10 projects, and for each one of them during the five years, we had five or six counterparts because the government was constantly changing. Even when they had the same President, the counterparts changed all the time. That was interesting because they were all very dedicated, intelligent people, but each one wanted to change the project organization and orientation. They did not want any link with the past; they wanted to do something different that they could identify themselves with and could be their contribution. We the outsiders, were the ones who were saying no we've done that; we've tried that; it doesn't work. We were the

ones who were putting the brake on new ideas and saying we've got this project that your predecessor committed himself to. We've got to do these things in the next three years; we've got to achieve these results. It is a wonderful story because our roles were completely reversed. The outsiders became the conservatives and the local people were the innovators.

We spent the month of August last year in Bolivia. My wife's fourth grade students are now professionals; they are now in their early 30's. They were the ones who were my counterparts in this short term assignment a year ago. It was an incredible story. They remembered my wife very fondly. The people I had worked with are still in Bolivia, but they are retired and mostly in the private sector. Some are doing very well. It is just how things change. It was a wonderful, warm experience. Bolivia was considered the least desired assignment in Latin America, but for us it was perhaps our best overseas experience.

Q: Why was it the least desirable?

JICKLING: Because of the altitude, and it was a relatively less developed place. It still is remote and because of the altitude, a lot of people have trouble adjusting to it. It had that reputation of being a difficult post. They didn't want to go to Bolivia. I was offered this job in Bolivia. It was the first time I headed a public administration program, and I jumped at the opportunity and it worked out perfectly.

Q: Well let's talk about some of these projects. You had ten projects; what were they?

JICKLING: Number one and most successful with CENACO, a computer center with the highest skills, amazing people who have gone on to do all kinds of innovative things. For example, developing a program to translate English into Spanish with computers, but using Aymara, the local Indian language in Bolivia as the link between the two. An amazingly creative system. That's what the head of the center did. The number two man went on to be the senior person at the regional tax administration center based in Panama. He is still there today concerned with professional exchange on tax administration matters, an outstanding group in this area of public sector management. The CENACO organization still exists and does creative work.

We went into computers for statistical and census purposes, but above all for tax purposes. The IRS, Internal Revenue Service, provided people on loan from their system to work specifically with CENACO. We bought the equipment for them, and then helped them put it into practice to improve their tax collection systems, income tax and sales tax, and it worked. Customs was equally important. The major source of revenue was not income tax or sales tax, it was customs collection for Bolivia, and we had a major input dealing improving the customs operations.

We helped create an institute of public administration. We built a building for them. It is one of these cases where the shell exists but not too much happens inside. We created an institute for local government development, Service for Urban Development (SENDU). It went literally out of business because it became an institution to provide welfare for its own employees. It had little if any outreach.

We had a separate institution concerned with auditing, and this has caught on. This was a program

on fiscal responsibility which was a great success story in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America. This was of major interest to the IDB, as it was concerned with control of corruption and how to get public sector people to use resources more effectively for public purposes. Auditing is the key way you do it. You don't do it by talking about ethical standards and codes of ethics and whatever. You talk about it in terms of people going out and checking up on how money was used. We had a Puerto Rican who was an absolute master in training in this area, and it caught on. The Controller General's office in Bolivia is a great success story, and with our support. It clearly had local support, but outside technical assistance clearly made a difference. When I was there last August, I had a chance to talk to people about this activity. The heads of the organization were both junior officers, collaborators with us in the 70's, and now in the 90's they are in charge. In other words, the program has achieved greater public accountability in a government which was as corrupt as any in Latin America.

We worked in other areas. We had a budgeting improvement program. We had a fiscal management program, which except for auditing, had very little impact. It was supported by one of our best public administration consulting groups in Washington. They worked for 10 or 15 years in Bolivia, but their notion, at least in my time was that they were the experts and they would sit in their office and if the Bolivians wanted help, they could come. But the Bolivians didn't come to them. They should have taken the initiative and gone out to the people. They had that self-centered kind of egotism.

Q: In 15 years they didn't learn?

JICKLING: They were the experts, and if the Bolivians want assistance, let them come to us. They know we are here. It is a sad thing because I don't think you get anywhere that way. That was a good case study of a technical assistance team with marginal results. We were constantly trying to work out a strategy to get them in touch. For example, hosting parties. Every Thursday night for five years in Bolivia, we had a dinner party at home. It was very carefully orchestrated every time. We had Americans and Bolivians concerned with a problem. We sat around the table, we had a good time, a social time, but we also were trying to overcome this problem of hesitance about really getting in touch with the concerns of the managers. Often, in office situations, the person who is hired by AID is concerned with specific project objectives. The counterpart has his own priorities, and if they don't coincide, they just ignore each other and go their own way. It is a tragic waste of resources, so very often these informal dinner occasions were the perfect circumstance to get this kind of informal linkage to get things moving. I worked with all of the projects, but I was directly involved in the day to day operations of the local government program which went absolutely nowhere. Tony Cauterucci, a former AID Mission Director, is a contractor there working with local government development organizations, very similar to our efforts 20 years ago. It has the same basic objective and I hope he achieves more than we did.

Meanwhile I picked up other education areas. They were concerned with administrative reform within the Education Ministry. There was a task group concerned with the administrative reform of education. We also had a group concerned with rural education. We were developing projects concerned with teacher training, bi-lingual education, and rural education. This was the 1970's, and the old timers who had done their service in the Ministry of Education in the servicio days of the 50's working with American ideas and American people felt right at home. We just picked up on the same

ideas. We were just going back to the servicio ideas which said Indians count. Let's see what we can do to get school systems to work at the community level with the Indian population. How do we train teachers; how do we provide materials; how do we provide bi-lingual education. There was a real push on rural education. Rural education in these countries like Bolivia and Guatemala is essentially Indian education, non-Spanish education, and it is another ball game. It is like nothing that most teachers or advisers from the United States at that time had experience with.

Q: Well, looking over those projects, some worked and some didn't. What would you point to as the principal characteristics of why some worked and some didn't?

JICKLING: It's a good question, but it's hard to pinpoint an answer. So many of these successes depend on happenstance. They depend upon a local person in charge who has real mystique. Ivan Guzman de Rojas who was head of the CENACO group, for example. His father was a master painter, a real giant in Bolivian painting. Ivan had within him somehow this self-confidence that he got from his father. He came in to this data processing situation. He is the one who went on to use Aymara as a bridge for translating Spanish and English with computers. The mystique, the dynamism, the confidence, the leadership that he expressed, was important for the success of the activity.

Q: He was there for quite awhile.

JICKLING: He was there for 10 years, and also was able to get the resources from the government, not just the outside resources. We bought the computer. The government provided the building and the people. He provided training and we provided some technical assistance. The whole thing came together because of the exceptional leadership of that one person. That's one example. In education we achieved marginal results. I remember vividly one of the headaches over contracting. We let a contract for rural education. A support group from the United States was coming to help Bolivia with rural education. One of the contractors who didn't win the contract came forth with a corruption charge that the winner had paid off the Bolivians in such a way as to get the contract for themselves. I was in the middle as the project manager. I remember it all to this day. I don't know whether someone was paid off or not, but I remember how it just poisoned the whole process, about whether there had been an illegal bribe for this group to get the contract. They went ahead with the contract. They are a major contractor here in Washington today, and you would know the people that brought the charges against them.

Q: Was it investigated by the Inspector General?

JICKLING: The Inspector General came right out and talked to me, asking what happened and why did it happen. I was as cooperative as I could. During the rest of my time in Bolivia and in AID later, it was hanging over my head, this charge that things had not been done properly. The failure in education related to a charge which may or may not have been true, but which poisoned the whole atmosphere. You can imagine how our counterparts were dismayed. Whether or not they had been paid off I don't know, but things were never the same again.

Q: That held it all up.

JICKLING: Yes. It not only held it all up but created this atmosphere of suspicion. In other areas like local government we created what was I thought an effective institution, but when I went back 10 years later, I found that impossible situation of an organization with no other function than serving its own staff. Then when I went back last year, the organization was gone and absolutely forgotten. Another organization we created, this public administration training institute, exists, but as a shell. It doesn't have any real impact.

Q: You don't know why they deteriorated or never got off the ground. Lack of leadership, lack of government commitments, or...

JICKLING: Yes. All of the above plus others that I don't know, but I just am saddened by it because we didn't achieve what we set out to do and yet instead of disappearing like the local government institute did, the training institute persists but without any substance.

Q: Some officials think that sometimes when you are introducing a new technology like you did in the computer business, it tends to grab talented people with enthusiasm and therefore tends to succeed where if you don't have that you don't get the attention and priority that a project needs.

JICKLING: That's true, but those are happenstance things that you can't really predict.

Q: Well, any other aspect of your work in Bolivia? Does that pretty well cover it?

JICKLING: We loved the country. We traveled the country. I was in every department (province) except one, the most remote of all. Every region of the country is dramatically different in terms of culture, language, tradition, the way people behave. Often people say it isn't a country; it is a conglomeration, but it is a fascinating country in terms of topography, people, local culture, and crafts. Like Guatemala, half the people are Indian. It has about the same population as Guatemala, but it is 10 times bigger. It is in the middle of South America so that in the course of two tours and five years there, we were able to visit every country in Latin America except the Guyanas. I visited them professionally in temporary assignments but with our family we visited many of them and had a wonderful time. We enjoyed it and it was a most memorable and satisfying experience, although it wasn't highly successful. It was kind of the swan song of public administration. I don't think I was replaced.

I did sit at the ambassador's table in Bolivia. First I sat at the table of Ambassador Ernest Siracusa. That is a fascinating story that I don't think has ever been told. Siracusa served during the government of J.J. Torres, a left leaning government. He threw out the Peace Corps and was ready to throw out the Military Attaché's group aide before he got displaced by a coup d'état which brought in Hugo Banzer who is the current president. I sat at the ambassador's table when the American embassy was under siege. Posters all over the country were anti-Peace Corps. This is Bolivia during the 1970-71 period when it was the target of an anti-American campaign in which the Peace Corps was portrayed as a pig with the American flag very prominently displayed on them. Week after week while we talked about this and suffered the tear gas, there were demonstrations in front of the Embassy, the Peace Corps volunteers in the countryside being assaulted, being robbed, being driven out of town.

It was a tragic experience. I didn't suffer directly except for the tear gas, but I did observe a difficult moment for U.S.-Bolivian relations. The Peace Corps finally was withdrawn. Within a few months the government itself fell, but it was a difficult time. The new ambassador, William Steadman, was a University of Maryland graduate. He got the University of Maryland people in Bolivia together like an alumni meeting. I had a special relationship with the Ambassador, as I had been teaching at Maryland. Do you know Steadman?

Q: No.

JICKLING: Wonderful guy. Absolutely a straight arrow, just an amazing person. He has been active in a number of activities for the development of Latin America and Bolivia since he retired from the State Department. Sitting at his table was a completely different circumstance because there was an immediate rapport and an interest in his success and the way in which he handled the administration of the programs. He had been a State Department Officer; he had been a Program Officer on loan to AID. He did a beautiful job, and he became sensitive to AID strategies and problems in a way that no other ambassador that I had ever known. This man was remarkable, and to sit at his staff table was a wonderful experience, and to be invited to things not just of a social nature but of a business nature, things that showed a man of just great interest and empathy with Bolivian development, Bolivian leadership, Bolivian activities. This was the first time I had ever in my career felt that I was part of a country team. Later in Nicaragua something like it happened when we were trying to push Somoza out. In Bolivia, we were trying to help a new government, a government that was not anti-American. It was a military government. Banzer was a general who came in to overthrow the left leaning government. Steadman was a dedicated, professional diplomat, a development diplomat of the highest quality, with concerns as to how to orchestrate the whole range of programs in a way that would be creative and constructive. He was an absolute delight to work with.

Q: Well, he may have already been interviewed. Why was there this anti-American feeling at that time?

JICKLING: There was no question that left leaning people interested in communism were partly the basis for anti-Americanism. Whether true or not, there were reports that Americans particularly the Peace Corps were involved in sterilization activities. This probably was trumped up, but it was widely believed.

Q: A population program.

JICKLING: A population program, yes. The Peace Corps to my knowledge, were not involved in it at all, but there was a film made of it which is still shown at American universities among liberal student groups. It showed the American advisors, ostensibly Peace Corps volunteers, carrying out abortion and sterilization activities in the most forceful way that created the basis for a lot of the opposition to the Peace Corps. The Bolivians have had a love-hate relationship with everybody including the United States for a long time. They have been in conflicts with every one of their neighbors in the last century and have lost every war, every conflict they have had. It is a country besieged.

Q: What is in the Bolivian character that sort of...

JICKLING: Well, the Bolivian character is one of a feeling lack of self-confidence, the fact they lost these wars, the fact they lost their access to the sea which to them is a national tragedy, the fact that the U.S. has often not been supportive. "Time Magazine" ran an article while we were there where anonymous State Department officials were quoted say well the best thing to do with Bolivia is to carve it up into six or eight parts and just give it to their neighbors. It just doesn't have anything to hold it together. This report embarrassed the American presence and contributed to anti-American opinion.

Q: What was your understanding of the U.S. interests in Bolivia? Why were we concerned with having a program there?

JICKLING: Because it is the poor country in South America. Haiti is poor in the Caribbean. Honduras is kind of a close second. Bolivia is the poorest country in South America. It is a country with tremendous potential in terms of resources, not only mineral resources but others like forest resources. Unfortunately, the great growth industry for the last 20 years has been coca for cocaine. A major portion of the cocaine coming into the United States is produced in Bolivia, processed in Colombia and shipped to the U.S. The strongest U.S. interest in the last 20 years has been control of coca production. Earlier, it was related to its resources like tin, the potential of the country, the fact that it is so centrally located, and the fact that it is extremely unstable. In 100 years it had 100 different governments.

Q: Why is it so unstable?

JICKLING: That is a good question. It is not easy to answer. It is one of these things that is self-fulfilling. Everybody wants to be president, and there is a good chance that a lot of people will be president in that situation. If not president, at least ministers. If you believe you are unstable, everyone has a desire to become president or minister. People are always plotting; the rumors are persistent. Politically it's a very exciting place, but...

Q: It must be hard to get anything done.

JICKLING: As I mentioned, in our projects we had new counterparts typically every year trying to do new things. The achievements in that type of situation are often marginal.

Q: In a more recent development, my understanding is that some agencies have pulled back and others simply try to bypass the government to implement their program.

JICKLING: Yes, they try to use PVO's. My son went back two years ago to work with Catholic Relief Service. That is a good example of going the PVO route. They were doing essentially the same thing our agriculture projects and our community development, social development kinds of things, but they were doing it independently.

Q: Does this approach undermine the development of effective government?

JICKLING: No. I don't think so. I think it is complementary and lots of AID programs have gone that route. I think it is an important approach to development. I don't think it replaces government to government, but it complements it. Whenever you have instability and inability to carry out programs by government agencies, it is a reasonable approach.

Q: Anything more you want to add on the Bolivian experience?

JICKLING: It was the high point of our career overseas. My wife and my family really enjoyed it. It was a wonderful experience because of the warmth of the Bolivian people, the interest they had in cooperation with the program, even though they changed all the time, their diverse cultures, and the opportunity it provided us to visit all the countries in that region to get to know South America.

Q: How have you seen Bolivia change over the years from the time you were first there?

JICKLING: Tremendous modernization, incredible growth, vertical growth. The city La Paz has grown up with multi-story buildings. When I was there in the early 70's, we were in one of the tallest buildings in the city. It was six or eight floors, the American embassy. Now there are 20 and 30 floor buildings throughout the central area, just tremendous investment, business, traffic, new streets. The growth is dramatic because La Paz was a backwater and a relatively less developed place. Now it is a dynamic center, and Cochabamba, the second city, even more so. It is full of activity and growth, construction everywhere, and remarkable change. The third city, Santa Cruz in the 60's and the 70's because of oil wealth, was a dynamic modernizing city. It was the only city in the country where you could drink the water because of the wealth generated by oil revenue. A portion of that income was used for local public works, for development of the community. The reason for the growth today is coca. Coca is the one crop in Bolivia which has been a major success in terms of the kind of thing we were looking for in the 70's, an agricultural product that would help small farmers and be broadly beneficial. Not plantation agriculture, not just help the rich from the elite families. It would be a crop that would help a broad range of small producers. Coca has been exactly that. I talked to several people who worked in the coca growing area with technical assistance programs. Those farmers who raise coca are eager clients for technical assistance in agriculture. They absorb all the information about alternate crops, oranges or tea, about improved agriculture techniques like fertilizer or insecticides. They raise all the new crops, but of course, they use that same improved technology on their coca crop, and they are increasing their production every year. For the last 20 years coca production in Bolivia has gone up, and with it really dramatic broadly based wealth. A large share of that has not just gone to Swiss banks; it has gone into real estate development and high rise construction in La Paz and elsewhere in Bolivia.

Q: Have you been involved with any of the programs for reducing coca growing?

JICKLING: No, I have only had conversations with people like the friend who worked in the Chapari which is a major coca growing area. Their effort to introduce alternative crops and how the coca farmers are wonderful clients. I think it is an uphill battle. I just don't know if and when the supply

can be reduced. The demand they say is the big problem, but the problem has both sides: supply and demand.

Q: Has this distorted the effort to develop a viable government?

JICKLING: No, I think it has been a positive constructive source of income which has not gone just to the rich and not gone abroad but has been invested in the country.

Q: It doesn't have a Mafia that controls it?

JICKLING: No question the Mafia controls the processing, shipping, and marketing in Peru and Colombia. I have worked in Paraguay which is another major trans-shipping point

Q: This doesn't lead to corruption of governments and other functions?

JICKLING: I'm sure it does. I don't know if it is more than previously but in Guatemala which is a major trans-shipping of cocaine coming to the United States, there have been local government people who have been bought off so that the airplanes coming from Colombia can land and re-fuel and go on. There is certainly lots of corruption in how the money is laundered. Building after building in Guatemala and I assume in Bolivia are paid for with cash, U.S. greenbacks, the whole construction right through to the final turnkey apartment or office are paid for with cash. Then the building becomes marketable in local currency. It can be rented or sold at a bargain price. That money then becomes legal and can be freely converted into any currency.

Q: Well, any other dimension of the Bolivia experience you want to bring up at this time?

JICKLING: It is interesting for us, because our lives have been focused on Guatemala, in that there are so many similarities between the Indian population, the traditions, also the difficulty of working with the indigenous people, but also the great differences between Bolivia and Guatemala. The differences in terms of the spatial dimensions. You can drive in Bolivia for several hours and not see a person in many parts of the country on the major roads. It is a broadly spread out population. While in Guatemala today, throughout the country, you can hardly get out of the sight of a house wherever you go. This, of course, is extreme in countries like Indonesia where you literally urbanize the whole countryside. For 60 miles roads in Indonesia are lined on either side by houses, for example, between Djakarta and Bandung.

Q: The population pressures in Bolivia are not that great?

JICKLING: The population pressures are concentrated in certain urban centers but the countryside is essentially devoid of people. Probably because the alti plano has a very inhospitable climate and inhospitable soils.

Q: Well, let's move on. You left Bolivia in 1975, and where did you move to then?

**Joined the staff of the USAID
Development Studies Program in Washington - 1976**

JICKLING: I came back to Washington at the time of the bi-centennial. I was here in '76 and spent two years with the Development Studies Program. This is the mid-career program for AID officials. I went through five cycles of that program. Each one was four months long and so got to know all those mid-career people who since have gone on to senior jobs in AID and have been retiring recently. It was a wonderful experience not only to be exposed to the theories of development which we talked about constantly and to the focus on small farmers which was the AID priority at the time, but also to share and discuss with these young people the experience they had. They were all five to ten year veterans of foreign assistance working in all the countries, and they had been hand picked. They were the best of the development community.

Q: What was the thrust of the course; why did they have the course?

JICKLING: I don't know how it actually began, but my understanding was that the course existed because we felt we should do better in foreign aid. In Congress there was a major political force to push AID to be more productive, to be more effective, to have more of an impact, and to focus on small farmers because somehow, and this was a la mode at the time, it was the feeling that too much of our assistance had been focused on programs that just helped the rich get richer. The other benefits would follow if small farmers were more productive of the development community. In the World Bank there was a major agreement with that theory, so it fitted in with the priorities. Development studies was a means of showing the people on the hill that AID was doing something about being responsive to this by training its people to be more appreciative of the potential for small farmer programs.

Q: What was your role in this course?

JICKLING: I backstopped three technical fields in the course of public sector management, education and health. I was responsible for designing those parts of the program, identifying the people who were invited to make presentations. Some of the discussions I led myself, but most of them we got outstanding people from Johns Hopkins in public health, from the educational institutions like the Academy for Educational Development which was very helpful for us, and then they would come in, lead a discussion, and some kind of exercise or activity to get across their ideas.

Q: This was contracted out at that time?

JICKLING: No we were all direct hire. We had about four or five academic people. Dick Blue, our director a political scientist out of Minnesota. Jim Weaver from American University was a brilliant economic development specialist in. Three or four were individually contracted. There was no umbrella contract group for the program.

Q: I see. You talked about the small farmer being the focus of development. What was the development theory beyond just the small farmer that people were trying to convey?

JICKLING: People oriented, social oriented development was the goal. Infrastructure was fine but not sufficient. We needed change at the grassroots level. We had lots of jokes about it because we didn't really believe in it too much. A small farmer is one who is five feet-three or under. This kind of black humor. We were always looking for small farmers. A very interesting part of the development program was to go out and look at the poverty program in the United States and see where it had worked and where it didn't. We took each group of trainees to the southern Appalachians or Alabama. I remember in Boone, North Carolina, we spent ten days in the southern Appalachians trying to find a small farmer. Do you know, we couldn't find one. They just didn't exist. We found poor people, but they were usually mothers on welfare, single parent families. We found retired people who were poor. We found no small farmer who was earning their living from tilling the soil in North Carolina. It was an area that was becoming increasingly popular with retired people. People moved to Florida and then they came back because it was too hot in the summer and settled in North Carolina around Asheville and the Great Smoky Mountains. The point was that we were not able to find much from the poverty program experience in the United States, which was relevant to our overseas work. The theory being we would see what made for their success that could then be applied overseas. The small farmer is a disappearing breed in the United States and I think in most of the world too. It certainly isn't the key to development that it was in the 1970's.

Q: Most of the population of the developing world are rural and live on farms.

JICKLING: Yes, but they scratch out a subsistence economy. The chances of getting them into the market is so slim that less attention is given to them in today's development activities.

Q: When you were teaching these courses on public administration what was your line of presentation?

JICKLING: With some difficulty we talked about the approaches to improving public sector management. The trainees didn't really much care about it because AID didn't care about it, and they reflected AID's policies. They were much more interested in preventive health programs, for example. They were more interested in education in terms of what we called manpower surveys. That was a popular approach at that time. Send people into a country; look at the kinds of growth that is going to take place, identify the skills that need to be developed. There was a lot of interest in that. Fred Harbison of Princeton came down regularly for our courses. He had worked extensively in Ghana and Nigeria and other African countries. He said AID ought to be doing this kind of skills analysis in developing training programs. Often that could be done by the private sector. They could be done by on-the-job informal training skills development. It was very well received. I don't know if any of these AID officers went on to do anything along that line, but it was an aspect of development studies that was very well received.

Q: I know it was very popular at that time, but it was another of those ideas that came and went.

JICKLING: The Johns Hopkins people came to tell us about preventive medicine. They convinced us that the single most important intervention that we could do in development is to introduce potable water, in poor communities. From that will come a better health status. We were convinced of that.

I'm not sure if it still holds up, but it was kind of a dogma.

Q: What about any of the other areas that were being taught?

JICKLING: The other areas were particularly economic theory. We had a wonderful time with Jim Weaver. I sat at his feet for all those five cycles of the course. Jim Weaver is a brilliant analyst. We did all kinds of comparative studies of private sector and state planning organizations. Kenya and Tanzania, for example, what made the difference, which was successful and which wasn't. Tanzania was one of our great success stories in terms of concern for poor people and dedicating public services to needy people. This was before the Reagan era and the push on private sector and the market economy as the key to development. We were not necessarily convinced that Cuba was better than Santo Domingo, but we were sensitive to the kinds of innovation particularly in education and health that Castro was doing in Cuba and saying we ought to look at it.

Q: Well this was clearly at a time when there was a new direction in legislation I guess, and that was underlying the philosophy of your program.

JICKLING: It was to be sensitive to alternative approaches that would have an impact on poor people. Countries like Tanzania and Cuba were worth study.

Q: Did you debate the question of a focus on the poorest of the poor or on the poor majority? That was popular at the time. What was your understanding of what the objective was?

JICKLING: We heard discussions about what absolute poverty was. McNamara was president of the World Bank and he was dedicating his program to absolute poverty. It was a little bit like the small farmer being five foot three or under. We never could really agree or understand what absolute poverty was, but we all had a sense, and Harbison always talked about "bottom end" poverty. You had a sense that these were people like who sleep in the streets in Washington. That is "bottom end" poverty. Every country has more of these than they should have. How do you reach them is another question.

Q: Was that your understanding that AID was supposed to focus on the poorest or was it really more the lot of the working poor?

JICKLING: The feeling was the Development Studies Program was dedicated to the proposition that trickle down was not effective. The idea that you couldn't get development just by making the rich richer and letting benefits trickle down, that entrepreneurs would create jobs and other people would benefit. You had to dedicate resources to bottom up development. Do you remember "Small is Beautiful"? This was our bible, a wonderful book. It was said that small is beautiful meaning you don't have to have a huge infrastructure program as long as you do something that addresses the needs of poor people. That was the purpose. That was what we called the New Direction. Small farmer were just one aspect of it. The concept was not necessarily address yourself to the poorest of the poor, but make sure that your programs were responsive to the needs and would be helpful to poor people.

Q: Do you have any feel for what the impact of the DSP training program was on the AID staff?

JICKLING: I don't know. I think our trainees were sensitized to the needs of poor people, but I think the advent of Reagan economic thinking in the 1980s took away the underpinning of the New Directions of AID in the 1970s.

Q: You got echoes of that criticism?

JICKLING: Development Studies continued in the 1980's. It would be very interesting to see what happened to it in terms of those questions because obviously it became responsive in the 80's to the "pillars" of AID which included free market economy and local democracy. I'm sure it became responsive to the pillars, the new priorities. I never went back. I was asked at one time to be part of a proposal writing team because they did contract out the Development Studies Program. During the 1980's I helped one of the contract groups make their proposal. I spelled out from my experience what development studies ought to do. To me the most important thing it did then and can still do is networking young comers in the development field, people who are movers and are going to the top. Get them together. The State Department does this; AID ought to. At the age of 35, if they are comers, not over 40 because they are going to leave at 50. Find them and bring them together so they can see their colleagues. That networking will help them for the next 10-15 years they are going to be in the agency. Secondly, expose them to the brightest, ablest, most articulate people in the academic and development world concerned with these things. Bring them in, the Harbisons, the Weavers, the others; put them in a stimulating situation which causes them not only to read but more importantly to listen and think about key issues, like "small is beautiful" or whatever the counterpart is today of stimulating theory. Then, tell them to read and work and think about themselves in relation to other people. This is what we used to call a T group. Do you remember the idea that we would sit down and look at each other and say I don't like the way your hair is. Level with people. What they did in Development Studies toward the end of the cycles was very useful. Participants led discussions with a TV camera on them. Then, they let the people see themselves as other people see them so you would become more aware of your little mannerisms, the way you talk or whatever. I think it is a good idea to let people see how other people see them, and the video technique is a good one. The T group concept was to get feedback from people that you normally don't in the normal course of events. It can be a terrifying thing. It literally tore some of the missions apart when it was tried overseas. They never could get back together.

Q: That's right, it could be very destructive. Well, anything else on the Development Studies Program?

JICKLING: I enjoyed it. It was a great experience. Five or six cycles was enough for me. I was looking forward to an assignment, and an old friend of mine was appointed director in Nicaragua and he asked me to be his program officer. I could never say no, so I went to Nicaragua which was the end of the earth for me.

Returned overseas to USAID/Nicaragua - 1977

Q: What year was this?

JICKLING: It would have been in '77.

Q: What was the situation in Nicaragua at that time?

JICKLING: Terrible. It had gone from bad to worse. There had been 30-40 years of Somozas, father, son, brother. Absolute dictatorship, little concern for development other than private aggrandizement, just profiteering, greed of the worst sort. We put up with it. Somoza who was president at the time had supporters in Congress like I had never seen before with any foreign government. He was an anti-communist. This was during Carter's regime when anti-communism wasn't a great thing, but he still thought of himself as a cold war warrior. He had support from individual members of Congress. One was Congressman Wilson from Texas who kept coming to Nicaragua because Somoza wanted him there for this or that. Then there was Congressman Murphy from New York that also was a major supporter. He had been a classmate of Somoza. Anyway, we went into a situation where Somoza was doing his thing. He had very close relationships with the American embassy all during the Cold War.

Carter wanted to commit his foreign policy to support for human rights. Warren Christopher, who was number two in the State Department, became head of a committee to review foreign aid in relation to human rights. We would use foreign aid as an implement to improve the human rights situation, and Nicaragua would be our case in point. I was there for two years in Nicaragua as Program Officer, and during that time we didn't get one project approved. We went through all the motions and every time we came up, the Christopher committee and their people said no. We were not going to cooperate with this SOB. For example, in '72, about five years before I got there, there had been a horrendous earthquake. Managua was leveled. We gave 40 million dollars to restore Managua. We found out in the course of administering this money that Somoza is profiteering from almost all of it. He has the factories that are making the blocks that are being used in the reconstruction of the city streets. He owned the areas where the new commercial development was taking place; where roads were being built. He took advantage of the earthquake reconstruction money hand over fist. We are told that we can not go forward with that. So, we got in a complete bind on the most important project in Nicaragua at the time. At the same time we were coming up with agricultural projects and education projects. We were a fully staffed little mission and each one of these technicians wanted to create his own little project while he was there and make a contribution, to have a project that works and makes a difference and gives him the basis to go on to bigger things in AID. Meanwhile, Washington is saying you can have no project unless you show that you are bypassing the government and are not helping Somoza. He won't profit from it, and that you are helping the poorest of the poor. We got no projects approved at all while I was there, so it was a case study in frustration.

I sat at the Ambassador's table and during all that time, and I since have seen the Ambassador, Mauricio Solaun, a Cuban American, an academic out of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, a specialist in coups d'état, overthrow of governments in Latin America. Behind the scenes he was told let's get rid of Somoza. The Assistant Secretary of State, Peter Vaky, said, "Let's get rid of Somoza." This story has been told in two or three major accounts publicly in the last 10 years. The "Last days of Somoza" is one of them and the others have to do with the same period.

Vaky was unable to get the movement in Nicaragua that the State Department wanted. Solaun was there if not to overthrow the regime, at least to nudge and let Somoza know that now is the time to leave. The Sandinistas were in the wings, coming up. One of the most popular newspaper publishers was murdered on the streets and the finger pointed to Somoza. In fact he didn't order the killing, but one of his friends did. The fact is we were trying to distance ourselves because of human rights, because of Somoza's greed, and all the rest. I sat at Solaun's staff table, it was so sad for him. It ended up that the State Department ignored and abandoned him, and he quit. The whole transition to the Sandinista government is a great misadventure. America's role in that process, whether we could have done it better is a story which will be studied for years to come.

Q: Why was it a misadventure?

JICKLING: Because we did not help the progressive elements in Nicaragua move forward. We left in 1978, a year before the fall of Somoza, but the lines were clearly drawn for him to go. The question was how to do it, how to ease him out, how to help. The big theory and this is your question, what should we have done? We should have helped the dissidents the people who were against Somoza find a non-Sandinista middle ground that we could have supported. The Sandinistas were clearly aligned with Cuba and in many respects were fiercely anti- American. There were other elements, such as the Chamorro group. His wife subsequently became president. Our goal should have been to find the basis for a non-Sandinista center government and supported them and gone to Somoza and said now is the time to go. Solaun could have done that, but for some reason it didn't work. We left with a great sense of tragedy. Solaun was replaced by a new ambassador. The new Ambassador said to the Sandinistas, "Let's work together." He had 75 million dollars to help with the transition. The Sandinistas said no thanks, and we left.

Q: They closed the mission?

JICKLING: They closed the mission. It was 10 years before it came back. Now they are back and doing well, but the situation is much the same if not a little poorer than when we were there.

Q: You were there just when the lines were being drawn. You could see that in your own staff and work situations?

JICKLING: Absolutely. Well, the problem was the country was being divided down the middle between those who supported Somoza which included the army, and some of the wealthy people who were sharing in his greed. He let people run the airline or run the beer works or run the steamship line if he shared in the profit. It was a little series of monopolies that he controlled. So he had his followers, but the other people who were against him were the progressive elements, the Sandinistas and other people who were anti-Somoza. We were not able to politically find a middle ground and to help build support for a new government group.

Q: Did you find that manifested in your staff? The split?

JICKLING: Oh definitely. We had people on our staff, a lady worked in the controllers office for

example whose husband you would say was a henchman of Somoza. He was in the military and very close to Somoza. We had others like my secretary, who was a fervent Sandinista. She eventually left Nicaragua and went into exile in the United States because she did not want her teenagers to be exposed to the Sandinista value system they were teaching in secondary school.

Whatever, when I reached the magic age of 50, I had the opportunity to retire. My wife was teaching, so we didn't leave until her contract was over. Her contract ended on the third of June at 5:00 and at that hour we crossed the border, driving back to Guatemala. We left foreign aid exactly 20 years after we joined. It is all kind of symmetrical because we joined AID in '58, retired in '78 after 20 years of AID. I went on to some other activities and now it is 20 years later. It's been 40 years since I began in AID and 20 years since I left AID.

Q: There was no program in Nicaragua while you were there?

JICKLING: We continued trying to do the Managua reconstruction without success. We had a brilliant health officer and education officer that I worked closely with, both very well intentioned, and an agricultural officer and a community development officer and technicians in a couple of other fields, all had good intentions. None of them could get new projects, but they all had old projects which they were trying to carry forward.

One was a very imaginative program which was responsive to our new initiative. The people who were our counterparts were among the ablest people I have met anywhere. The program was called INVIERNO, which is the word for winter. The purpose of it was to reach poor farmers with two crops a year. They raised corn, but then because of the dry season, they could only raise one a year. How to reach and produce a second one during the "winter" was the purpose of the program. It was a masterful program, well designed. It was as though the people from development studies, the theoreticians had gone down to Nicaragua and designed a perfect program to reach the small farmer with a perfect rural development - small farmer project. The people who proposed it were all Nicaraguans and were able, articulate, wonderful counterparts. So, we all got behind INVIERNO, and the government gave lip service to it because the people who were head of it said to Somoza this is the price you have to pay for American cooperation. Before, you were anti-communist, now you've got to be small farmer. He said fine we'll support small farmers. Show me how to do it; I'll sign. So, he signed up for INVIERNO and it was a model small farmer program. I doubt if the program had any long term effect although there may have been, but in terms of design and the way it was operating it was excellent.

Q: It was effective at the time.

JICKLING: Right. Because of good leadership, good resources on our side and particularly good talent on the Nicaraguan side, and because it was a game that Nicaragua supported even if the leaders didn't believe it - they said okay we'll play it. The amount of resources that went in to it were adequate and the program moved forward.

Q: Was it fairly widespread in the country?

JICKLING: INVIERNO was concentrated in certain areas as a pilot project. You can't apply a new technology countrywide, so it was decided to do it in a selected area and then replicate it. You know, the "oil spread" concept. We talk this and so often it doesn't happen, but that was the theory of INVIERNO.

Q: Any other ongoing projects?

JICKLING: Family planning really hadn't caught hold. Malaria, however, was a major health program. Within the city of Managua, the capital city, there were areas where we were told not to go because of malaria. When I was there a couple of years ago on a TDY looking at decentralization of education, I went to a club meeting. When I was there 20 years ago I had belonged to the same club, and we picked up exactly where we left off. It was a wonderful experience, except one of the members my age had a terrible case of malaria. Malaria was one of our big programs. This is back in the 70's. Today in the 90's it is still a major problem because the mosquitoes are immune to the sprays we use. We have not been able to figure out how to eradicate malaria even in the capital city. It is a tragic thing, but that was one of our big efforts at the time.

In education we supported activities like schoolbooks, teacher preparation, and school construction. The Sandinistas came in and threw out all those textbooks, printed new ones. Now the Sandinista texts have been thrown out because of their value systems and symbols. Now, in the new texts, we are back to family values of the Catholic Church. That is an interesting little story: how school text books represent changing political regimes.

When the Sandinistas fell, the new government, the elected Chamorro government, had to fill its positions in the government. They went to the church because the church had supported the fall of Somoza and of the Sandinistas, too. They asked the archbishop what ministry he would like. Education! The new Minister of Education went back to traditional values, family values. The Sandinistas were committed to social betterment, to community consciousness, and service. You remember their great literacy program? They took every secondary student out of school for a given period and went out into the country to help poor rural people learn reading and writing. Adult literacy was a major effort of their outreach. That was the kind of Sandinista values reflected in their textbooks. Those went and this new set of Catholic family values were substituted.

In each of the areas we continued to do the projects. The sad one was our inability to move forward with Managua reconstruction. That city today looks like the earthquake came last week. It is still devastated; it's tragic.

Retired to teaching international development in Michigan - 1978

Q: Well, very good. Then you retired in 1978, and what did you do?

JICKLING: I went back to my childhood home. My parents had died and I bought it from them. I moved back to Michigan to my roots. My wife had grown up in rural Michigan. It's a beautiful country except for the winters. Once you are away from Michigan winters, you never want to go back.

We lived there for three years during the winters and five years during the summer. In other words we were there for five years. First I looked for teaching jobs. I didn't want to retire in a sense. I have never retired; I'm always looking for work until this day.

I got a job first in a small liberal arts school, Olivet College, which is a typical small town college. I was teaching international relations and development, and the politics of developing nations, subjects related to my previous experience. The college was interested in those fields, but I could never get them to take students for the winter term to Guatemala. That's what we really wanted to do, work on a program abroad for college students, so I went on to teach at Western Michigan University.

For two years in the early 80's we took groups of students to Guatemala for the winter term. It was a wonderful program. We would get a group of about 20 students. We would give them an orientation to the country, plus language training. We'd house them with local families. Then we'd give them an assignment. They would do a research project, for example, on rose growing for export. One student did a beautiful study on that. We did that for two years, but then the violence got so bad the parents were calling up the university in Michigan and saying "Why are you sending our children to a war zone?" So, they had to abandon the program. Then we brought students here to Washington for the winter, to show them how Washington works. That was a good program, too; we loved it. It was a good introduction to national politics.

We were five years back in Michigan, but they say you can't put people back on the farm. For us, number one was the weather. We had been thirty some years away from Michigan, and you don't realize how bad the winters there can be. Secondly, I was unable to convince the first school I was in to go to Guatemala. Because we continued to have a home in Guatemala, it was a logical thing to think about going back and forth with students. Western Michigan was only able to do it for two years but that program evaporated because it depended heavily on subsidies from the university, and most of the funding which came from the honors program was evaporating. Michigan in the 80's was in the hardest of times. The university budgets were being cut back. Automobile production was way down. It was a real depression. Michigan was suffering. The bumper stickers said, "Will the last person out of Michigan please turn off the lights." All our students, for example, all the good ones were leaving the state. Our children, three of them studied in Michigan. None of them are there now. It was a sad period for Michigan, and we left too.

Assignments in development administration and local government in Ecuador - 1983

We went to Ecuador, my first long term assignment after leaving AID. During those five years I had many, let's say one or two a year, short term assignments because I had old friends in government and they asked me to go here and there. The people who were doing development studies were now all Mission Directors, and they remembered me and asked me to do this and that. I had done short term assignments all together in thirty some countries all over the world.

In 1983, the Dutch government, because I had worked with them in the 1960's in this decentralization program and had been in constant touch with them, asked us to head a program which would be a

regional training center in Quito, Ecuador, for local government officials from Latin America. We went down and spent two years in Quito to organize the program, build its linkages with local government institutions like IBAM in Brazil to identify training needs, to develop training programs, and to carry out consultations related to national training programs. The Dutch were very interested in impact. How do you know that you are making a difference by training? We wrestled with that question. We ran through six or eight seminars a year on subjects like how to improve tax collection, how to improve solid waste (garbage) disposal, how to handle public relations of the local government, etc. They dealt with the mechanics of managing cities today in Latin America.

We had a seminar in Costa Rica on credit systems to fund local government public works. How do you organize a revolving loan fund that local government can borrow from in order to build public works? Revenues generated can then go back into a revolving fund. Both central governments and municipal governments were interested in that kind of a question.

Then in '85 we came back to Washington. Now for 14 years I have been working as a consultant. I have worked with AID from time to time in programming responsibilities in different missions but more in project design and evaluation. I also work as a volunteer at the Smithsonian.

Special assignments in development administration

Q: Were there any major exercises like that which proved instructive?

JICKLING: Well, each one was a little case study in itself. They are so varied and widespread. I spent a month last year in Equatorial Guinea. This is one of the poorest countries in Africa. It was a former Spanish colony. The UN sent me because I spoke Spanish. The UN in its wisdom in New York said we should have decentralization in Equatorial Guinea. So, I went down and spent a month talking to people. I couldn't find anyone in the private sector or the public sector who thought it was important and believed it had any chance. The government is run by a small group called the "royal family." The best book about it is written by a World Bank consultant. It is called *Tropical Gangsters*. They run the country like Somoza did, for personal gain. They have a contract for fishing, for example. The contract is let by the family to the international fisheries. The government doesn't even hear about it. There are no records at all. It is that kind of corruption, which benefits the powers that be. They were not interested in the UN program at all, but I spent a month going through the motions, talking to everyone, writing it up. The UN is very unhappy with my report because nothing happened. Well, it basically said there isn't any local support. They didn't want that answer, so it is kind of sad. That is typical of consultation. If you tell it the way it is, not what the client wants, you end up making everybody unhappy. That was just a typical example, and every consulting experience has something like that, just a little case study of development.

Q: What about some of the others?

JICKLING: The most recent one was last February. I was asked to be on a task group in Guatemala on bi-lingual education. That was the same way. We found that the Indian population and the Indian group within the ministry were all for it. Let's move with bi-lingual Spanish and Indian language

education now. The students begin their primary studies in their local language. The Indians would like them to have the full primary, six grades in their own language to study their traditional culture and to be more aware of their roots. Others only say three years should be in the mother language. Then have transition into Spanish in the last three years of primary school. The fact is the Indian group in the peace process and the non-formal groups in the communities say yes let's do it, but the people within the education ministry have little interest. The task group that I worked with ended up making a report. I don't think the matter has moved an inch forward since then.

Q: What was your idea?

JICKLING: My idea on the program was that unless you get political commitment to bilingual education, you are not going to get anywhere. It is not a technical thing. It isn't a matter of how you organize bi-lingual education or within the ministry what kind of agreement you are going to get. You have got to get political people who count, people in the Congress, other community leaders to say now is the time and we've got to do this. It is sort of like race relations in the United States. You can have a panel like the President has now on improving black-white relations but it isn't easy to do it. The problem of bi-lingual education in Guatemala is like that. Certainly it is like California which recently voted down bi-lingual education. There is strong pressure from the powers that be to integrate the nation which means let people rise above their language limitations. Don't use public funds for training in other than the national language.

Q: Were you involved in their educational theories about learning capacities?

JICKLING: No. I was there to look at it from an organizational point of view, but I was really interested in the policy aspects. We had another guy who had worked extensively in Latin America in bi-lingual education programs because lots of governments have them. We also had a man who had worked extensively in the United States from the Office of Education's point of view on bi-lingual education. The real problem as I see it is there is lack of a political commitment.

Q: Were the education people saying there is a theory that establishes that a certain level of indigenous language use is a base for developing second languages and that you shouldn't discard it?

JICKLING: The basic position of the education professionals is that if you teach students in their own language for the first two or three years, it puts them in a learning receptive mood. They understand what is going on in the classroom. They are going into a warm situation they can understand and then later talk about a transition to the national language. Whether you teach them six years in their own language or whether you give them three, is an important question. The Indian rights people say six years is needed to properly understand the depth of their own culture. There are 22 language groups in Guatemala which further complicates the logistics of it. At the end of either three years or six years the students would have the basis for going on in Spanish. No one is talking about secondary school in the local language; they are talking about either three or six years and transition into Spanish.

Q: But the government would not support any indigenous language?

JICKLING: In Guatemala, they are doing token programs. All the donors, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank, ADB, AID, Germans, they are interested in this. They all support bilingual education. If you have 22 Indian languages, each one of them have tended to develop their own alphabet. How do you get uniformity among them? How do you get materials that can be used by all the different groups. There are groups that are interested in these questions. There is an Academy of Mayan languages which is interested in the alphabet and teaching materials. The Summer Institute of Linguistics is interested in translating the Bible, but that has gone into a whole series of other linguistic materials. So, there are lots of people concerned about this. AID formed this study group because there are all of these different donor groups sitting down and asking what can we do about bi-lingual education? AID said we will fund a strategy study. AID has had a project for 20 years in bi-lingual education in Guatemala. One of the recent ones was for the Academy for Educational Development to map the country in terms of language, who speaks what where. That was a major effort. It cost a lot of money; it was done with very advanced computer technology. The point is AID volunteered and AID changed its Mission Director while we were doing this study and the new director said to the education chief "Does the government want to do this?" The AID education officer was honest enough to say not really. The Mission Director said why are we doing anything if the government doesn't want to do it. It was a good question to ask. Meanwhile we had this task group going doing all kinds of manipulation of options, we can do this and we can do that. I basically didn't have much to contribute other than to say that it is a political thicket. It is a political decision and the technology alternatives aren't going to advance the cause.

Q: Are there some other assignments that gave you some interesting insights?

JICKLING: Management education at the Catholic University in La Paz, Bolivia. I spent a month looking at an AID supported project to help the Catholic University which is a first rate university, a private school doing much better than the public university in La Paz. It also has branches in other parts of the country. Their contractor for the program is the Harvard Institute of International Development, HIID, not the business school. It seeks to create a program of public sector and private sector management training at the graduate school level. It is a good program done by an outstanding group of people from Harvard. I was asked to evaluate it. The real problem was that Harvard hadn't tried to create the basis for continuity. They are doing the program themselves rather than developing the capability of the Bolivians to carry on in the future. When they stop, what's going to happen? It might just disappear. Harvard hadn't been willing to help them in building support for the program such as fund raising. The private sector in Bolivia ought to really be supporting it. There are other things that ought to be done to make the program sustainable. That was a fascinating study because they are doing such a good job, and yet the prospects are so dim for the future unless they turn around their efforts and focus on sustainability issues.

Q: Why was Harvard resistant to doing that?

JICKLING: Because of the personality of the project manager. The project manager was one of those prima donnas who went down and he was going to do it right, meaning his way. He wasn't about to

do fund raising, he didn't do fund raising, I mean that wasn't in his scope of work. He wasn't able or willing to bring in people to do it. He wasn't able or willing to spend resources on developing the local staff; he wanted to contract outsiders to come in and do it right.

Q: How could they operate with out local staff?

JICKLING: They had them but they didn't put the resources in to develop their capabilities, and they kept them as kind of junior trainees. This is overstating it but these are the problems of an outside contractor with tremendous prestige coming in and really doing a poor job because of the nature of the team leader and the way in which the project was organized.

Q: When they finish and walk away, there is nothing.

JICKLING: It happens over and over. There is no great mystery, but to the credit of the people within AID, they were interested in the future impact of this project and asked me to come in and see what they could do. I suggested that they think in terms of sending more people to Harvard for graduate programs and try their best to develop linkages with the private sector within the country to provide funding and support. There were a series of other steps which they could do which we would call "institution building."

Q: Did they follow your recommendations?

JICKLING: Yes. I was talking recently to the person who backstops the project in Harvard, and they are moving in the right direction, so hopefully something will happen in the long run for the continuity of the project.

Q: What do you do when you do a democracy assessment?

JICKLING: You go in and see whether or not there has been any more involvement of the local community, popular participation, that's the word. In the 1960's we had Title IX in the foreign assistance act, which said we ought to be involved in supporting popular participation. Now that is called democracy. The basic idea is to see how can you involve people more in setting priorities and in making local government decisions. In a country like Salvador which considers itself a model in this area, AID wanted to know how they were doing with local town meetings. It's a tradition, but it is difficult to do. You have to change the culture, but there is a long tradition of having on special occasions an open town meeting. So, the idea is to expand it. In the post war reconstruction of Salvador we put a lot of money into bridges and schools and facilities that were destroyed in that civil war. The communities as a condition of getting the money for rebuilding have to be involved in decision making. What is more important to re-do the bridge or the town hall, decisions like that. So, there has been a new emphasis on community participation. The question is has it worked, has the central government been more favorable in terms of supporting local governments of the same political party or have they been equally interested in other parties that grew out of the opposition in the civil war, these kinds of questions. Salvador is making progress, there is no question.

Q: How do you rate community participation?

JICKLING: You go to a town meeting and see how decisions are made about what the community is going to do. Typically community participation means getting out there and helping to work on a project. You know that is what the old community development talked about community participation it meant not just deciding, although that was part of it, but, more important, it was work, voluntary labor to help with the construction of the project or the maintenance of the project or some aspect of it. Now the emphasis is on participation in the sense of local decision making, what should be done, what are the resources we need, how can we get the resources, and how can we help maybe with even paying taxes to support the project in the future. Those are the things that the AID missions are being asked by AID Washington to evaluate how they are doing on local democracy.

Q: How are they doing?

JICKLING: In Salvador they are doing pretty well. In some of the other countries they are not doing too well. Look at Paraguay. Paraguay had overthrown a 30 year dictatorship. They have had a year of democracy, and they wanted to know how they were doing. I said the labels have changed, but there is no change. It really hasn't moved at all toward local democracy.

Q: Still a top down?

JICKLING: Top down, and local government is so weak it is almost non-existent. Look at local governments where the municipal finances are run out of a cigar box at the home of the municipal treasurer, it is that informal. They have a long ways to go. Paraguay is an example of the other extreme.

Q: What should one be doing in that kind of a situation?

JICKLING: You've got to have some kind of exposure to other systems. The best thing local government people can do is to see what Chile is doing for example. Chile has not only become an economic powerhouse but a local democratic powerhouse in the last 20 years. How do you get the Chilean experience and the Brazilian experience introduced in Paraguay. It is close to both of them, but it is very isolated. Paraguay is an island surrounded by land meaning it is so isolated it is tragic. I would think the most important thing is that they get more in touch with what other neighboring countries are doing.

Q: What are some of the things other countries are doing?

JICKLING: What the others are doing is supporting decentralization through revising codes, municipal development codes to give them more authority, more taxing authority, more responsibility, revenue sharing, the kinds of things that give more resources to local government. Recognition of innovations in local government is also important. In Latin America there is a whole series of what they call success stories. How do you get the story I mentioned earlier about collecting garbage in a bag and getting a bus ticket for it, how do those kinds of success stories get diffused? The

communication of those successes to other local governments is so important.

Another thing was decentralization of education in Nicaragua. The mission was interested whether it is working in Nicaragua. What we found was it is working in secondary schools. In rural secondary schools what they are essentially doing is privatizing. There isn't enough money in Nicaragua and most developing countries to provide a full eight or twelve years of public education. The resources just aren't there, and there are too many kids. How do you funnel the contribution of parents into supporting the schools? What they do is very interesting. They don't pay the teachers at the beginning from local funds but they give teachers a bonus. They are paid by the ministry like always, but they get a bonus which comes from local funds, but the parents have to say whether or not they will give them. Basically they give it to them when the teachers are there. If the teachers are there, they get the bonus, but they use their money as an incentive, a carrot to get the teachers to come.

Like in the example we were talking about in Guatemala, it is hard for teachers to get to some of those remote communities, and they go Tuesday and they come back to the city where they live on Thursday. As a result they are at the school for three days instead of five. Their contract says five, and this new privatizing of education essentially gives the parents through a PTA kind of the parent's organization, the authorization to collect money and to give the teachers incentive payments if they are there five days. They are starting at the secondary schools and are gradually moving toward privatizing, meaning increasing the contribution of the communities to elementary schools. Traditionally, parents have to pay for school materials which are quite expensive for poor people. We are talking about the equivalent of five or ten dollars for each student. Each January as they enter schools, they have to have pencils and notebooks, which are expensive. Some schools have to have uniforms which are a problem for some poor families. They have a tradition that the parents have had to pay something. So then the question becomes can we notch it up one more and have them pay a contribution which would be for an incentive to get the teachers there or it would be used for school maintenance or for buying school materials, thus to shift a little bit toward community control and participation and management and financing of local schools.

Q: Okay. Other assignments?

JICKLING: I was back in Ghana to look at decentralization. I found it very much the way it was in the 70's. It hadn't changed very much.

Q: What was the situation?

JICKLING: It was a UN program looking at decentralization in Ghana. I urged Ghana to become more aware of what other countries are doing. I gave a whole series of examples of comparative experience.

Q: What was the problem in Ghana?

JICKLING: Ghana was doing all right, it just could do better in terms of taking advantage of the decentralization and local government experience of other countries. Incidentally, there are no

countries in Africa moving in this area. It is very sad, but there are countries in other regions they can look to.

Q: What do you think is the bottleneck to moving that way? Why haven't they moved more aggressively toward decentralization?

JICKLING: In Latin America, the organization I worked with was the International Union of Local Authorities based in the Hague in the Netherlands. They had created the Quito center for interchange and local government in Latin America. There is another similar center in the Near East, in the Far East, and two in Africa. These are regional centers focusing on local government development. In Africa, they have a French center in Abidjan and an English speaking center in Kenya, but they haven't been able to get the same degree of cohesion and push that they have in Latin America partly because of the division of language, partly because of other divisions. There is more sense of community in the nations of Latin America than there is in Africa.

Q: Why within the individual countries was decentralization difficult?

JICKLING: The UN who sent me on this particular mission to Ghana said it was caused by a lack of capacity building. Tell us what the country needs in terms of capacity. To me capacity building is opening the eyes of people and giving them exposure to new approaches, new ways of solving problems.

Q: What did you impart from your other examples?

JICKLING: Comparative experience, sending people abroad, opportunities to see things like IBAM in Brazil. Bringing people from IBAM to Ghana. Trying to build linkages with the IULA group in Kenya and the UN Habitat group concerned with the same things. So often these people work in isolation from similar kinds of efforts. The purpose of an outsider coming in, it seems to me, is to share experience, to bring people into contact, to get them to be aware of what others are doing and how they would go about moving from where they are to take advantage of the experience of others.

Q: Were there certain units in the group or the government that were supporting this move?

JICKLING: In Ghana, the GIMPA, the Ghanaian Institute of Management and Public Administration was supportive.

Q: They were the ones you were working with. And the government itself?

JICKLING: In the government itself there was interest, but not enthusiasm. In GIMPA there were selected professors dedicated to these studies.

Q: You didn't sense any commitment to decentralization in the government?

JICKLING: No, but interest and push came from the UN. The basic question for the UN is we've got

money for capacity building, how should we use them in Ghana? It was also guiding other donors as well as trying to identify concerned people in the government. Typically these assignments involve helping donors figure out what investments, what interventions will make a difference, and what are the institutions, and who are the people they ought to be associating with these efforts.

Q: And they rest on whether the Government is interested?

JICKLING: In the process of identifying institutions and individuals, you are talking about public sectors, although in Equatorial Guinea the UN said forget the government because it really isn't going to do anything. Find the PVO's, the private groups that will foster decentralization. I looked in vain. Even the Catholic Church which is the strongest private group in Equatorial Guinea is so weak it just isn't in the cards.

Q: Any other assignments that you want to bring out?

JICKLING: I've enjoyed these assignments. I find that people are not as interested, well the fact they asked me to go is a good thing, but I'm clearly identified with another generation. I'm now in the third generation behind these people. In other words in the AID mission the generation that I was in is long gone. The generation we helped train and their counterparts are gone now. This is what happens after 20 years. They are in a third generation now. There is a real hesitance to, in a sense, let their hair down and ask what can we learn from the past. Cynthia, my wife, points out maybe I talk too much. Maybe I'm too eager to tell people what I think and not patient enough to listen. It is a real art to be able to help people with new ideas.

Concluding observations

Q: What is your sense of the talents and abilities of these people that you see now overseas compared to those you knew 20 years ago? Is there a change?

JICKLING: I'm delighted. I'm delighted with the young people. I'm just amazed at their quality. I'm amazed at how many of them are hard working. I mean diligent people understanding their country, not just sitting in their office. We often criticize AID people for just sitting there in the office and hiring people to do all the outside work. The extent in which they are involved in the outside and the outreach, the extent to which they are committed to mastering languages and local cultural differences, the extent to which they are professionals, the informality of AID. Internet has completely changed the way which people communicate in the agency. For years we communicated with telegrams. We had special words for them and different kinds and levels, but they all had to go through the hierarchy and be signed off. As I was leaving the telephone took its place and people were calling all over all the time. Then afterwards faxes came. Faxes were such a miracle because you could communicate. I was in Bangladesh for six months for one of these assignments, and we could communicate back and forth with Washington and have a response the next working day. We'd put it in at 5:00 P.M. The reply would get there at 8:00 A.M. It was a perfect system Fax was everything. Today I find young people using E-mail the same way. Extremely informal and doing it without regards to the hierarchy and to bureaucratic ways. I'm sure for Mission Directors and people trying to coordinate things it is

very difficult. I see young people take advantage of the system to do all kinds of interchange and networking. I don't know how they attempt to control communications. I think it is increasingly difficult because of E-mail, but I think that is really an amazing change. I find that young people are remarkably talented. I think of individuals like the education officer in La Paz who is extremely conscious of these kinds of questions we are talking about of what makes for effective relationships and support and what the roles of outside donors are. I'm very pleased.

I think that AID to its credit has tried to keep the notion of a career service. I don't think that the IDI program exists as it did before, but there is that tradition of bringing in young people and pushing them up. When I joined AID they were all old timers. They were typically people who had finished their career in a technical field like customs administration or tax administration and they came to work in their 60's for AID. This was the pattern in the 50's and early 60's. Then in the 70's they began and pushed the idea of IDIs (junior officers), and I saw those people not only in the Development Studies Program, but I saw them in the IDI program. Those are people who went on in the 80's and 90's to take senior positions. I thought that was excellent. The IDI program brought in bright young people like the Foreign Service has done traditionally and gave them significant responsibility and pushing them ahead. It was a great system. I hope the agency has continued something like that. I have not been over to visit the Reagan Building and I have no sense of what is going on today, but I hope for the best.

Q: Why do you think there doesn't seem to be much receptivity to the fact that a lot of these things were done before, and what works and what doesn't work?

JICKLING: The culture of AID has been to design short-term projects, not to support long-term programs in a broad sense, individual projects which will have very specific results. We used to call them outputs. Results that are measurable and significant in a limited time frame. There is no advantage to showing how this is building on the past or related to past activities. The way people get ahead is by innovating, meaning designing something which is fresh. This goes back to my theory of what successful technical assistance is, that we haven't talked about.

Q: Well let's talk about it.

JICKLING: I have a "jumping up and down" theory. Two ideas, one is support long-term development programs rather than short-term projects; the other is jumping up and down. If you go into a situation no matter what the technical area is and try to do something which is the typical American approach. You know what is right and you are going to do it. Hopefully the local people go along and carry on afterwards. In fact they seldom do. Number one you don't communicate very effectively because of the change of environment. Number two it is never theirs; it is always the outsiders' activity. At the most they go along but they don't really adopt it. They don't make it theirs. So, there comes the performance of the outsider which may make a contribution but it is a fleeting contribution, and the person goes. The "jumping up and down" theory is that you go in to a situation in any field, malaria control or family planning or elementary education, and you look around, and what you find are some people who are interested in this and some people aren't. Some people are comers and have influence in the institution and the environment that you are working in. You go and

find the person that is really going to do something in the area, the Ivan Guzman de Rojas in Bolivia in computers. Then you jump up and down behind him. You support them like cheerleaders. You just do everything you can for them in terms of (1) you send them to professional meetings, (2) you send them abroad, not too long because they may not come back and you can't achieve anything while they're away. You send them abroad for training; you give them the support they need because none of them have enough. They don't have a vehicle. You can't pay their salary usually, but you can provide them with a computer; you can provide them with support; you can do this and that. Basically you find the people who are focused on the kinds of objectives you think ought to be achieved, and you support them. That is the way in which you have effective impact through a local person, by supporting them. That is what I call jumping up and down because that is what you are doing really, saying "right on," "that's the way," "let's go with it," and so on.

The other way and that is the most fundamental problem of AID, is the project. The notion that things are discrete, identifiable, measurable, and limited. Meaning in a certain period of time, you can change significantly the way things happen, the way taxes are collected or the way malaria is spread. We know that in most cases the hard problems don't work that way. Building a road, building an irrigation system, a hydroelectric dam, and a schoolhouse, building infrastructure can be done that way. But, the major things, the most important things like better health, better water supply, better education, smaller family size, democracy, the big program objectives of AID have to be done on a long term 20 year period, whatever, a career period. You commit yourself to a program meaning support for significant initiatives, not only projects which are discrete and identifiable, but initiatives which will further these kinds of objectives in this country or the other. That to me is what we, the US, ought to be doing in development assistance. Committing ourselves to worthwhile programs, doing it through locals with this "jumping up and down" idea of support for individuals who are moving ahead in the right direction. Those are my theories.

Q: Well coming from a management orientation, how does one manage a program like that? Twenty years, that requires a lot of sustained and consistent effort to do that. How do you do it? How do you make it happen?

JICKLING: The only way to do it is to go into countries with a long term commitment and go back to the servicio concept. The servicio may have been a mistaken instrument because it tried to set up a parallel group, but what it did is say we are not going in for two years or five years, we are going in for a generation. Commit themselves long term to working with the countries which need our help the most, sub-Sahara Africa, Haiti, maybe Bolivia, Bangladesh. I don't think there are more than 30 countries that fit this category, but countries which we ought to be really committing ourselves to long term assistance and to close cooperation with the other donors. AID over and over again as I've seen, and I suspect you have too, is so proud and isolated. It doesn't want to consult with other people. It doesn't want to take advantage of or cooperate with the work of others. They want to do a discrete activity for which they can claim credit. It isn't part of a cooperative effort which may be more effective but less easy to measure the impact of what your input was.

Q: Do you think these programs are not necessarily AID programs but multi-donor programs. Is that what you are talking about?

JICKLING: Some are, some aren't. In Guatemala, the country has been neatly divided up for full participation. Everyone is interested in local government and democracy. The Germans are working in a certain region. The Germans are very strong in this area, not only the GTZ but the foundations that are concerned about local government and local participation. The French are working with the UN in another region. The Canadians are working in specific areas. In other words you divide up the territory. A hundred years ago, Guatemala, a Catholic nation, decided to open themselves up to Protestant missionaries. They, and I suspect it has happened in other countries, said we don't want the Presbyterians working with the Congregationalists. All they will do is spend their time trying to recruit the members of the other church. We will divide the country up and the Seventh Day Adventists will go here, and the Baptists will go there, etc. They did the same thing, and I would think that we ought to support that methodology, but our commitment to a program would be such that we would become partners on a broad basis with the different donors as they approach a problem.

Q: Working with all the donors.

JICKLING: Yes, working with them. I have seen AID missions say in the program documents what is the contribution of other donors. They just write something; don't worry about it. It is like some of the old impacts like environmental "impact statements" that we used to measure and some of the other impacts that were never really given attention. I never saw a mission commit itself to working on a cooperative basis with other donors. I saw people doing superlative work in these areas. I never worked with English people. Maybe they were working in British Africa, but I saw other nationalities. I saw the Dutch because I was working with the Dutch.

Q: AID is very committed to results and has driven it very hard.

JICKLING: Good, I'm all for it, and I'm pleased to see that other donors especially the Dutch are so concerned about this. Often, they say, do not set your goals too high but try to figure out limited goals, limited activities where you can see some realistic results.

Q: Have you had a chance to be acquainted with the AID results programming approach?

JICKLING: I know about it, and I've seen the documentation.

Q: Okay. Well let's go back to your interest in public administration. You started out in public administration and then the terminology changed to development administration. You talked about public management, you didn't say much about that. What's the difference in the kinds of programs one pursues?

JICKLING: Public administration was strictly concerned with the techniques, the instruments of managing or administering programs. Development administration is using those analyses, those techniques but focusing on development priorities like agriculture, education, and health. Public sector management is stepping back and saying you need to have a concern for how things are carried out, not just setting goals and putting resources in, but helping with the process by which things happen. It is very much like the public administration, but public administration was concerned with

the inputs to development while public sector management is more concerned with outputs and results. It is clearly related to strategic management, to the notion that resources, goals, relationship between inputs and outputs are important. For example, coaching. In management today, there is so much emphasis on coaching. You can't really tell someone what to do or supervise them in that direct sense. What you have to do is get them to do a better job of what they are doing by coaching. Public sector management has more of this participatory, guiding development, the human resources aspect. Old personnel was concerned with hiring the right people, pay them, and give them incentives to produce. Human resource development says what is important is to get good people with good potential and then create the situation within which they can fulfill their potential so they can contribute to the organization to the fullest possible extent. That is human resources development. The same basic objective, a better functioning organization, but a different approach. Coaching is part of that. Public sector management talks about this. The conferences which are constantly held about these subjects talk about leadership in which they are concerned about how to get people involved, how to motivate people, how to do that extra bit that makes a difference. I would say the fundamentals are the same in all these programs from my point of view, but that is a very long range perspective.

Q: Are these concepts now part of the AID?

JICKLING: I don't know, I hope so. What I'm exposed to now are primarily requests for proposals. Hardly a week goes by that someone doesn't call me and ask if I would help on this proposed project or that one. These are contractors interested in developing an activity which AID will fund. They will spell out in that proposal what they propose to do, how they propose to do it, and what they expect to achieve over a given period, so it's tied into the results notion. Usually the givens are what the project is supposed to achieve. But, it is still the project mentality. I'm happy to help with these and I do it without compensation because I am just interested in these kinds of exercises. What I tell people over and over as we go through this process, because usually the people who are doing this are much younger and fresh to the field. They are responsive to AID's interest that things really happen. My basic concern is to say take a longer term perspective. Be a little more hesitant about saying you are going to turn the world around. Be modest in your expectations, but say things which are reasonable because so much of AID, my whole career in AID, is based on the notion that you are going to do much more than you really honestly expect to do. In the proposal a contractor ought to say let's try to do less but see if we can't make an impact by not reaching 27 communities but see if we can reach three or four communities in a way that will make a difference and then equally think about how that experience can be diffused. That's really what I contribute to these exercises of project design.

Q: Back on to the public administration, public management. What has been the relation to the private sector?

JICKLING: All the time AID is asking for people who have experience in private sector. I've been asked over and over if I can help on small enterprise for example. I've worked on the design of small enterprise projects. I tell people you know, I'm really a socialist and I don't have that experience. I believe in public sector achievement. I don't have the experience in the private sector. What I find is with the people that I know who work in the private sector organization kind of effort are either

doing something about which I know nothing, like how to privatize the banks in Ukraine. This is a real challenge, a difficult process. We've got a whole generation where the only banks were run by the central government. How to privatize the banks in Ukraine is one example about which I know nothing. The other is what is called small enterprise. To me, small enterprise is what we have been doing for a long time and I feel that I have something to contribute or whatever because it is closely related to community development. It is closely related to the credit programs that I have worked with in local government and elsewhere. It is how do you create the kind of support mechanisms that provide the assistance to people who are starting businesses, how to help them to make a viable institution, a profitable business. I haven't hesitated to help on that, but just on the fringes.

Q: Apart from particular activities, you must have had to wrestle with the question of comparative roles of public versus private sector in the management of societies. How do you draw the line; how do you characterize their respective functions?

JICKLING: This is a difficult question for me because my whole predisposition is to say that the public sector is the one that we have to place our faith on in terms of leadership for development. The private sector can contribute, there is no question about that. For example, malaria. Malaria is still a major problem. We still tend to think that we have to create public sector institutions to try to address it to get some kind of control. Maybe the real future depends on using public funds to invest in private sector investment which would develop a vaccine or something like that. It could be. I'm so wedded to the notion that you approach problems through public sector institutions that I tend to overlook the fact that maybe you can best solve problems through private research. There are so many problems like family planning and many other basic health problems that of course are so resistant to change that, new approaches are the only way to do it. E-mail. Should E-mail be controlled, or should it be completely private? This is an issue the United States is facing today. The question as we are selling more and more things on the Internet, do we pay the sales tax? Five years ago everyone said the Internet should be completely free, but then you get to the balance of maybe some controls, some kind of interventions. It is a difficult question for me. My whole experience has been to trust the public sector in spite of its imperfections. For most of the underlying problems of our society, government has to be the mechanism by which we achieve our common goals. The private sector isn't a solution to everything although it could be what puts the breakfast food on our table.

Q: Well, let's step back and look back over your 40 years or so in working on foreign assistance programs. Do you have a feeling that it has made a difference, been effective in the world in which you operated?

JICKLING: I hope so but it is hard to say. It is hard to be specific, but I think the world has changed a lot. Technical assistance has been carried out by all kinds of organizations apart from the public programs. There are all kinds of ways in which people, we were talking at lunch about the fact that many young people have come on their own to the United States or to Europe or other first world countries to study. These are people from good families, they have benefits in the sense that they study here at their own expense, and they go back to their country and they introduce change, private sector, public sector, whatever. They are innovators. At the same time we have our programs which have sent selected people abroad for study, observation, to get new ideas and come back and make

change. On balance my hunch is the people who have come on their own have probably made more of a long term impact than those which we have sent with public funds. Does that mean we shouldn't have sent people with public funds, I don't know. I just know that private people just because of who they are, their connections when they go back home, they are much more likely to be the ones who are on the leading edge of change meaning new productive enterprises, new ways of doing things, introducing new types of medicine, new types of educational technology, whatever it is. That is another question though.

In so many developing country situations public or private, the systems we talk about like the public health systems, the education systems, the agricultural extension systems have been the perennial clients of technical assistance, the poor. There are a lot of them. The people who count in the sense of being innovators, movers, and shakers in the developing world go to private schools from the beginning. They never set a foot in a public school. They never go to a public health facility; that is a last resort. They never go to a public health facilities even for a vaccination for their children. They go to private doctors. They don't go to government technical assistance people in agriculture or any other area; they go to their own professional associations, the rubber growers or the coffee growers or the rice growers or whatever that have some kind of professional group. They are the ones that make for change in all these societies.

Our instrumentalities and interventions that we are talking about tend to be in public sector institutions which reach the poor imperfectly but do not reach the ones who are likely to make a real difference. It is a sad commentary but my wife goes back and visits the villages and communities and sees her fourth grade students 30 years later, they have all gone to private schools. She never taught at a public school overseas but taught in a series of private schools. They are kids from wealthy families who have gone on to be leaders in the community. It is a sad commentary compared to the fact that our resources have gone into the public sector institutions that have not been successful in reaching the poorest of the poor in a significant way. It is an uphill battle. It may never be reached. In a country like Nicaragua, education may never be able to reach all the kids that are coming on the scene unless you do have privatization. So, in a sense, maybe I'm more of a private sector person than I make out to be.

Q: Well as a last comment, how do you assess your career and your experience?

JICKLING: Well, going back to fifth grade geography, I set out to see the world. I loved geography. I loved thinking about and visiting other countries. I went to the Philippines when I was 18 years old, to serve in the US Army and I saw another culture. I was intrigued. I came back and spent a summer internship in foreign assistance and never changed. From that first moment I was always in touch with people about overseas opportunities and had a commitment as my wife did that we'd like to go overseas. We went overseas and spent a career, bought a house overseas. We spend half our year now overseas. We love it. We love the diversity. We love the opportunities to travel. Jokingly we say we are really tourists at heart, we love going to different places and being in different cultures. We enjoy the excitement of being in a situation that is different and we try to understand. We are constantly learning and trying to figure out what is what, wherever we are.

Q: Well, let's conclude it there. This has been an interesting interview and thank you very much.